/152/

574 628 721 [262] [411] The majority of those from the aldea of Bisheasetjeti accepted the invitation. They entered Liatcoatjeti, hanging their hammocks from the trees, and they were served a soup made of boiled ripe plantains. Then suddenly they were attacked with axes, machetes, and other weapons. The leaders and the oldest were attacked first, and most of them died, but many of the younger men managed to escape, dropping everything and running for their lives. The enemies who were lying in wait outside also took the same road as those who had fled from the aldea.

727 The majority of the women were captured, but at the first opportunity all of the older ones escaped and returned to Bisheasetjeti. But the younger girls were afraid to run away, and for that reason most of them are now the wives of the men of Liacoatjeti or of their friends.

628 731 [499] The aldea of Majecototjeti (Platanal) was short of food. They constructed a bridge over the Orinoco and crossed it to make a visit to Bisheasetjeti and stay until their own farms might be able to produce more food. The people of Majecototjeti came to Bisheasetjeti just at the moment when those who had managed to escape were arriving and reassembling.

628 411 721 A messenger was sent to Yabitjaotjeti for arrows, and about six or seven boys from Yabitjaotjeti came with him, each one carrying a large bundle of darts /dardos, darts, lances/. These were quickly put together and their points put on. Bisheasetjeti was rearmed, and Majecototjeti better armed than before and ready to attack. The site of the aldea of Bisheasetjeti was abandoned at this time, for fear that the enemies might follow them to it. Both aldeas lived on what was produced by that of the Majecotatjeti /sic/. They crossed the Orinoco every three days to obtain a load of bananas from the farm located on the north bank.

166 722 628

One of the times when they came to get food, they found that the river had carried off the bridge. No one had a boat, and they could not cross. About three days later the men of Majecototjeti returned to the river and built their houses on the cleared place of the aldea. Meanwhile they lived in the forest near there. One day, that is to say after the aldea was ready,

000

722 /152 cont./ One day, that is to say after the aldea was ready,
499 the Bisheasetjeti also crossed; the bridge was /153/ cut by them near the bank. Guards were placed to keep a lookout for the enemy, should he try to repair the bridge and cross it.

727 Much after this, a raid was made on Liacoatjeti by some
[721] of the Bisheasetjeti and the Majecotjeti /sic/: "Jaiyeota," one of the Majecototjeti, shot one of them and killed him. A boy of four or five years of age was captured. One of the men from Majecototjeti, "Ushiu," took the boy and cared for him. All of the children were bothering the little one, calling him enemy and acting as if they were going to shoot him. One day, after this had gone on for a while, a young man from Bisheasetjeti shot the child near the water spring. He shot the arrow so hard that it passed through him. Ushiu gave the child a funeral, but none of the other inhabitants of the aldea came to the "lloro" /weeping/, because they said, "After all, he was an enemy."

628 The two aldeas had some bad times together. Often, when
721 they were in the forest, they had to come running back, feeling
578 sick. Frequently their ribs were showing. During this time
[164] several died of a strange fever which kept the victim hot day and night without relief. Others were very sick with the fever, and it
[361] was feared that they would also die. The two aldeas of Bisheasetjeti and Majecototjeti lived together for a year, until those of Bisheasetjeti made a new "farm" /granja/ down the Orinoco, on the other side of the Manaviche River. When they separated, friction caused by some women had reached such a point that the Majecototjeti summoned the Macolimutjeti, and both of them made a raid on Bisheasetjeti to recover the wife of a Majecototjeti who had gone to live with a Bisheasetjeti. One family did not take part in this raid and by its friendly and frequent visits prevented the two aldeas from shooting at each other.

628 Another incident of friction was that a young man from
578 Majecototjeti stole a Bisheasetjeti woman from her husband.
837 When the husband had almost persuaded his wife to come back with him, the Majecototjeti man shot him in the back with a bone-pointed arrow and kept the woman. The Bisheasetjeti man was seriously wounded, but recovered.

121 have a prescriptive marriage system. What the Purum say they do and what they actually do are two distinct things.

*621 5?8 *922 As I mentioned above, after Yanomamö villages reach a certain, critical size, they tend to fragment into smaller groups. The internal tensions that promote this instability are to some extent offset by external military pressures: members of a faction within a larger village may want to establish their own independent village to avoid club-fighting and to suppress more severe forms of violence; but if their village is being raided by members of other villages, [241] it may be impossible for them to do so. Occasionally a village splits into several factions, each establishing its own garden apart from the other, but the factions are forced *621 *628 722 583 582 ?18 [802] to reunite because of raids mounted by other groups. Generally, the process of village splitting precludes a later recombination of the same factions because these remain hostile to each other. Thus, the small, vulnerable villages that result from the fragmentation of a larger village are constrained to make marriage alliances with other villages, both to insure military assistance and because it is difficult to obtain women from their kinsmen with whom they are now at war. Village size and the balance of marriage exchanges between villages indicate that numerically weak villages are *621 *628 722 583 582 438 coerced by their stronger partners to give up women. In some cases, the disposition of desirable trade goods may affect the balance in the exchange of women between two villages. In general it may be said that, when one village

is allied to another which can provide it with more military assistance and desirable trade goods than the former can give to the latter, an imbalance in the exchanges of women will follow. The imbalance will favor the village that, for reasons of size and of existing military patterns, least needs the military aid of the other.

The character of Yąnomamö warfare is not as intimately related to village size as might be expected, although, of course, larger villages are best able to conduct warfare successfully over a long period of time from one location. Larger villages are less likely to be forced to abandon their location because of raids from smaller groups, whereas smaller groups are markedly vulnerable in this respect. Nevertheless, no one village is large enough to withstand successfully military pressures from a cluster of smaller, allied villages, and, therefore, the members of all villages seek defensive alliances with their neighbors. Such alliances are based on the exchange of women.

Other demographic factors, in addition to sheer size of villages, affect marriage practices. The ratio of males to females, for example, is high, partly because of the practice of female infanticide. Moreover, the shortage of women is compounded by other factors; sexual intercourse is prohibited with pregnant women and those who have nursing children, and polygyny causes an unequal distribution of the available women. It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences for Yąnomamö social organization of this single

*621 593 .152 602 cruel actions; that is, the extent to which husbands are brutal to their wives is largely a function of the number of kinsmen the women have within the village, particularly brothers. Some men have even killed their wives in fits of rage, but in all the cases for which I have complete data, the women came from other villages and had no kinsmen in their husband's village to protect them. Conversely, when women have brothers within the village, their husbands exercise restraint in their treatment of them, knowing that the brothers of the women will use force to defend them. It is [586] [598] not unusual for a man to take his sister away from a cruel husband and to give her to someone else; this inevitably leads to club-fighting and frequently causes the village to split.

181 152 *621 *602 583 582 Ideological considerations, therefore, promote friction and fighting within villages and lead to village splits; and, the newly formed factions are obliged to seek marriage alliances with other groups.

Economic practices

361 241 *722 Local groups abandon residential and horticultural sites only when forced to do so by the raiding pattern of their enemies. For the most part, the Yąnomamö are able to predict the hostilities that will force them to abandon their gardens, and they plan accordingly. The first act of a war is frequently the clearing of a new garden at some distance *621 678 241 from the presently occupied site. If hostilities develop within the village and it is expected that these will

*621 escalate, the factions involved usually use the interlude
578 between a club-fight and actual killings to establish sepa-
24| rate gardens.

*621 Occasionally, however, a village suddenly becomes
*629 embroiled in a war that it has not expected, or fighting
24| within the village immediately involves shooting to kill.
36|
• 722 Then the only recourse for the group is to take refuge with an ally and subsist on the produce of the ally's garden. If the critical situation develops out of an intra-village dispute, the smaller of the contesting factions is forced to flee to another village where it has friends or relatives.

If all the members of a village are forced to take refuge in another village, they proceed to make their own garden apart from that of their hosts; then, when the garden begins to produce, the refugee group moves to that site to
[583] live. They do this because the price of protection is always
582 measurable in terms of the hosts' demanding access to the
[591] women of the guests, either as spouses for their own men or simply as temporary sexual partners.

Twice during the lifetime of my oldest Bisaasi-tedi informants their group was obliged to flee to an allied village to escape the raids of powerful neighbors, raids that resulted from the development of intensive hostilities before the group could establish a new garden of its own elsewhere. On both occasions the refugees lost a number of women to their protectors, and in neither case did they receive wives
*628 in return. Indeed, on the second occasion, the hosts planned
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628 726 574 to kill all the male guests and to abduct the women, but the hosts themselves unexpectedly became involved in a war and required the aid of their guests.

628 24 722 361 Yąnomamö dependency on cultivated foods, then, promotes political alliances with other villages; the warfare pattern is such that the members of a village may have to flee from their site to avoid the raids of their enemies. If they have not had time to establish a new garden, they need the support of an ally until they are able to support themselves.

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121 583 582 The variables that affect Yąnomamö marriage practices are numerous and diverse and combine with each other in complex ways. I shall show in the chapters that follow how these variables actually affect Yąnomamö marriage practices. At this juncture the point to be made is that Yąnomamö social practice in real life can not be completely isomorphic with the stated marriage preferences because the milieu within which marriages take place simply precludes such a neat fit. A functional, rather than a structural analysis seems to be demanded by the nature of the variables in question. I shall also show the degree to which we can predict actual marriage behavior, given specific information about the variables.

[724] [182] Finally, I should add that the Yąnomamö constitute a significant case for ethnological inquiry: this society offers

161 and as many as 250, but the lower extreme is uncommon because
162 of military vulnerability and the upper extreme occurs only
*621 when particularly intense warfare retards village splitting or leads to the coalition of several related villages.

361 Villages that are on peaceful terms may be found
*628 living within a few miles of each other, whereas mutually
922 hostile villages rarely are located less than a day's march apart; even then, one of the villages may move to reduce the possibility of raiding.

361 The village itself is circular or oval in plan, is generally surrounded by a palisade of upright logs and, depending on the number of people living in the village, has a diameter ranging from 15 to 70 yards.

361 The village is hardly more than a continuous, circular
342 lean-to roof, open at the center. The roof starts at ground level (occasionally one or two feet above ground level), rises at an angle of 30° to 40°, reaching a maximum height of about 25 feet. The un-partitioned segments of the continuous roof are built by the families who occupy them, brothers and their dependents living next to each other. The materials used in construction are long, slender poles, vines to secure the pole frame and a thatch made from leaves.

351 There are usually several entrances to the village, each located at a point marking the boundary of one segment of the roof with another, and are merely un-thatched sections of the otherwise continuous roof. Most of the entrances are only 3 feet high, although there usually is at least one

241 sweet-potatoes, bitter and sweet yucca (manioc), and two varieties of another root crop known in Venezuela as mapuey. Next in importance is the seasonal crop of peach palm fruits (pijiguao), groves of which are cultivated by the Yąnomamö. [222] Contrary to some accounts, the Yąnomamö never collect this crop from wild trees, although they do return to abandoned gardens to collect the fruit. Other economically significant crops include maize, sugar cane, papaya, pineapples, avocados, peppers and gourds. Also grown are cotton, tobacco, arrow cane, drugs, pigment (bixa), and a large assortment of plants used for magical purposes only. Both their feasting practices [433] [527] and their warfare pattern[1] stimulate the Yąnomamö to grow more [722] than they require for subsistence purposes alone.

241 361 Occasionally the gardens of a particular village may have a preponderance of yucca (manioc) and maize as compared to plantains and bananas. This is usually the result of the distance between the last occupied site and the new one; it is easier to carry seeds and cuttings of maize and yucca than the heavier plantain and banana shoots, and a village that moves any distance usually establishes its new garden largely from cuttings and seeds of these plants taken from the old [262] garden. Eventually, however, the plantains and bananas spread, and a mature garden will always have a preponderance of these crops, the preferred staple of Yąnomamö diet.

222 Wild palm fruits are important additions to the diet

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[528] [1]The Yąnomamö are occasionally obliged to take in refugee members of an allied village, and they plan their gardens accordingly.

000(lapa, Spanish).

222 The collection of small fruits, spiders, ant grubs, wild honey, crabs, mushrooms and fish also contributes variety to the Yąnomamö diet.

241 269 [146] (177) Cultivated foods contribute the greater proportion of calories to the Yąnomamö diet, probably upwards of 85%, although this figure would vary seasonally. Again, those Yąnomamö villages living close to Makiritare settlements cultivate much more yucca (manioc) than platanos, refining it in some cases to meal as do the Makiritares. Elsewhere [252] the Yąnomamö eat their yucca roasted or boiled or make cassave bread by a technique quite distinct from that employed by the Makiritare.

• 722 [422] Yąnomamö material culture is very much attenuated by comparison with, for example, Makiritare. The Yąnomamö like to limit their possessions to an amount that is readily transported by the women, because the entire village may be obliged at any given moment to abandon its site to avoid raiders, or may be invited to a feast at another village. [422] [574] They do not like to leave possessions in their village when they leave it, as visitors from other villages would take them. And, their warfare pattern precludes the possibility of leaving a few people behind to guard the village, as they [341] would be easily overwhelmed by a raiding party. When just a portion of the village leaves to visit another group, those that stay behind move into the jungle some distance from the village and live in well-concealed huts until their co-

722 361 villagers return from their visit, returning only to fetch food from the garden. When the men are away on a raid, the women and children are concealed in these temporary sites 221 361 574 922 until the men return. During the dry season when raiding and feasting are common, villages are frequently deserted; the men are away on a raid and the women and children are hiding in the jungle, or the entire village has gone off to participate in a feast at another village. This pattern has rather unfortunately been described as nomadism, or semi-nomadism, by a number of students of Yąnomamö culture. I wish to emphasize that the Yąnomamö population movements, annually or over a longer period of time, are almost exclusively a function of their warfare pattern and not economic considerations, as is implied in the use of the terms nomadism and semi-nomadism.

422 484 [411] [415] [372] [237] [352] [123] All males above 13 or 14 years of age have a bow, arrows, a bamboo case for carrying extra arrow tips, a fire drill, and several 'knives' made from the incisors of the agouti rodent. Both sexes have either a cotton or a vine hammock. These possessions are easily carried by the owner on long trips and are rapidly packed. Whenever I wanted to accompany a group of people on trips to other villages they always complained about how much of a burden I would be. It always took me several hours to prepare my packs, and I always took more than I could comfortably carry myself, having 484 to hire some of them to assist me. They, on the contrary, could be ready to depart within ten minutes of their decision to leave, having only to roll up their hammocks and pack a few

847 562 162 Several kinds of demographic data suggest that the rate of female infanticide is high. Table 1 gives the sex ratios of five Yąnomamö villages. The sex ratio for the total population sample (576 individuals) gives a more meaningful estimate of the rate of female infanticide, as there is considerable variation by village in the value of the sex ratio. The excess of males in the total population (8%) gives a first approximation of the frequency of female infanticide. The variation in the sex ratio by the village, on the other hand, expresses the political relationships of the villages to their allies. That is, the distribution of women in these five villages is a function of the military requirements of the particular villages in the marriage alliance network. Thus, the cline in sex ratio from Reyaboböwei-tedi to Bisaasi-tedi (ignoring the Patanowä-tedi, who are not allied to the other groups) reflects a dominance gradient in politico-military requirements of each village. The total sample of 576 individuals must be considered in order to estimate the frequency of female infanticide among the Yąnomamö, but the political relationships between the villages must be understood to account for the variation by village of the value

562 162 628 722 [583] 125 847 162 628 562

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 69]

847 562 162 114 982 selves, it is highly unlikely that men will marry a FaSiDa, despite the kinship terminology. Rose did not, however, consider the possibility that sibships may have a systematic bias in their composition; if males tend to be older than their sisters considering all sibships, the probability that a FaSiDa is of marriageable age is increased. I specifically questioned the relationship between female infanticide and FaSiDa marriage, and the Yąnomamö denied any correlation between the two practices. There can be no doubt, however, that the occurrence of FaSiDa marriage among the Yąnomamö is made more probable by female infanticide.

Their dependence
*628 on these allies was transformed into an im- 60
583 balance in the exchange of women between the two groups of
162 villages, accounting for the variation in sex-ratio given for
562
*621 the villages in Table 1.

*628 The degree to which each village is dependent on its
583 allies is roughly indicates in Table 1. The Reyaboböwei-tedi,
726 being closer, geographically, to the MöwÄraoba-tedi, suffered
722 more from the revenge raids of the latter. In other words, they needed military aid from their own allies to a greater extent, and have, accordingly, lost far more women to their allies as a consequence. But the true situation is even more remarkable than suggested by the sex ratio for the Reyaboböwei-tedi; a large percentage of the women in their village have been abducted by them in raids against the MöwÄraoba-tedi, i.e., they have actually lost more women to their allies in exchanges than is suggested by the sex-ratio alone.

*621 Again, the sex ratios for the Bisaasi-tedi and the
162 *628 Monou-tedi are misleading without additional information.
583 These two villages would seem, from Table 1, to have gained a remarkable number of women in the political alliances they
162 made with their Shamatari friends. This, however, is not the
*628 only reason they have such a high percentage of women in
*621 their populations. In 1950 these villages were victimized
726 by the MöwÄraoba-tedi and the Iwahikoroba-tedi in a treacher-
527 ous feast. They lost approximately 15 men. Were two-thirds
165 of these men alive today, for example, the resultant sex ratios for the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi population would more accurately reflect the dominance gradient, measured

595 in the family. The transfer of the woman from the older to
593 the younger brother was, in some of the cases, quite gradual. Thus, Kaobawä gave Hantoami to his younger brother, Shadadama, because his other two wives complained about not having enough game to eat. Kaobawä continued to have sexual relationships with Hantoami after she had become Shadadama's wife, and sired two of her children.

*629 Another form of permitted affair is called nohimou--
• 729 "to befriend" or "act like a friend" to a woman. This type
836 of relationship might occur, for example, when the members
837 of a village have to take refuge with an ally. The allies invariably enter into nohimou relationships with the women of the refugees. The refugees are reluctant to give their women as wives to the men of the host village, but they are obliged to permit them to have sexual access to the women. These kinds of affairs also develop within a village between a man and the wife of a friend, or, with single girls. Again,
*629 when men go on visits to other villages and bring trade goods,
594 they frequently are permitted to have affairs with the hosts'
438 women, particularly if the men have brought goods that are
837 highly prized by the hosts.
836

835 Incestuous affairs between classificatory siblings are quite common.[1] One of my female informants used husband

[1] Incest, to the (male ego) Yanomamö, is any sexual relationship with a member of one's lineage or with mother, mother's sister, mother's mother, and mother's sister's daughter. Failure to avoid a woman of the mother-in-law category is also incestuous in the eyes of the Yanomamö, but only if the woman is sexually active. Menopausal women of

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

left the field in February 1966, and had by that time involved the Bisaasi-tedi.

B. The Effects of Warfare On Settlement Pattern and Economic Practices[1]

When feuds, usually over women, can not be resolved peacefully, club fights between the supporters of the woman's lover and husband develop, leading to village splits and the establishment of mutually hostile, independent villages. The timing of the split, however, is determined by the nature of Yąnomamö agriculture: unless a large village has two gardens separated by a considerable distance, the factions in the feud can not separate to form independent villages.

The situation is similar with respect to inter-village warfare and village movement. The Yąnomamö depend to such an extent on their cultivated foods that their pattern of warfare necessitates the formation of political alliances with other groups. Occasionally members of a village find themselves in a situation where they have no choice except to move into the village of an ally and depend on the produce of the latter's garden. For the most part, the Yąnomamö attempt to avoid

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[1] Yąnomamö economy deserves intensive treatment, as certain groups of Yąnomamö practice 'pioneering' slash-and-burn cultivation, i.e., are moving into unoccupied territory. In this, they exhibit some interesting parallels to, and differences from, the Iban of Sarawak (Freeman, 1955. See also Carneiro, 1956 and Conklin, 1961 on shifting cultivation). For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I am concerned only with the general limitations that Yąnomamö economic practices impose on settlement pattern and how these practices affect Yąnomamö social organization.

these situations[1] by establishing new gardens as new wars develop; occasionally, however, the wars take on unpredictable intensity before new gardens can be established, and the members of the villages concerned necessarily seek refuge with their allies.

To the Yąnomamö, gardens (hikari) are the fount of subsistence. They acknowledge the relationship between chronic warfare and village relocation by being constantly on the lookout for new lands to settle. Men are always discussing the agricultural merits of the forested areas in which they hunt, and most new sites are selected on the basis of information collected by hunters. Thus, when the Namowei-tedi split up at Patanowë-thka, the Bisaasi-tedi faction moved to Shihota, an area they knew well because they customarily hunted there.[2] In 1965 the Monou-tedi cleared a new garden at Moyanabŏwei for the same reason. I accompanied hunting parties from Bisaasi-tedi on several occastions to new areas not normally frequented by these hunters, and the topic of agriculture invariably came up during the evening résumé of the day's experiences.

Other factors besides density of jungle, type of floral association, and general topography are considered by

[1] They avoid these situations because the hosts usually demand either sexual access to the women of the refugees, or wives for their bachelors. The refugees, of course, are reluctant to do either, but are frequently obliged to do both. The cost of the alliance, once again, is measured in terms of women lost.

[2] See Map C, and Chapter 5.

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abandoned in about 1959, to harvest the peach palm of that garden. We approached the site with great caution lest we run into a group of PatanowÃ-tedi. We discovered that somebody, probably the PatanowÃ-tedi, had beaten us to the garden and harvested the fruit.

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*628

During 1965 raids were so intense on the PatanowÃ-tedi that they were forced to abandon their site at PatanowÃ-tika. The Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi predicted that the PatanowÃ-tedi would make their new site at one of two possible locations: Shihota or Shamata, two abandoned gardens. Their predictions were right on both counts, for the PatanowÃ-tedi began utilizing both sites because peach palm was to be found at either. By occupying two sites, the PatanowÃ-tedi were also better able to avoid their enemies by moving frequently from one to the other.

The several variables to be considered in re-locating villages during especially hostile wars may be briefly summarized: (1) the members of a village will make their new garden site in a direction away from their major enemy; (2) if the members of a village have allies, they tend to make their new garden in the direction of these allies, provided that the direction brings them no closer to their enemies; (3) if abandoned villages whose gardens contain producing groves of peach palm are to be found in a suitable direction from the old site, these will be the ideal choices for new garden sites.

The cultivation practices of the Monou-tedi in 1965

illustrate how village shifts are related to warfare, and how foresight in establishing new gardens serves to facilitate village movement in anticipation of wars. The Monou-tedi planned to raid the Patanowã-tedi after the latter had recovered five of the seven women abducted by the Monou-tedi in November 1964. The Monou-tedi, of course, expected to be raided in turn by the Patanowã-tedi, so they began making a new garden in a direction away from their enemies, anticipating the revenge raids they knew would follow. In short, the Monou-tedi prepared for the war by initiating work on a new garden in a more defensible area--closer to their allies and across a large river--an action they hoped would permit them to remain completely independent of the largesse of their allies.

The graded violence pattern[1] of the Yąnomamö may be viewed from the standpoint that such a pattern facilitates the establishment of new gardens while villages split. Thus, grievances may be temporarily settled by club-fighting, and the estranged factions may utilize the interval between club fighting and more violent hostilities to establish new gardens. This is also consistent with the political philosophy of the Yąnomamö: chest pounding duels and club fights function to permit the aggrieved to demonstrate their ferocity in acts of violence, while the existence of several levels of

[1]The forms of fighting, in increasing degree of violence, are: side-slapping duels, chest-pounding duels, slapping of either the side or the chest with the flat side of a machete, club-fighting duels, spear-fighting duels, raiding with the tactic of ambush, and treacherous feasts. I have discussed this pattern elsewhere. Chagnon, 1967.

578 violence simultaneously permits the expression of hostility
+621 in such a way that the groups can split from each other on
241 relatively peaceful terms. The particular form of violence
182 employed in settling grievances is determined by a number of
152 considerations, one of which is the likelihood that the resulting factions will be victimized by the raids of a powerful
578 enemy. Thus, in the splitting of villages, the gradations in
+621 forms of violence permit of settlement patterns suited to
+628 given military situations. Villages torn by internal con-
241 flicts may find it easier to split into two relatively peaceful
361 factions and remain geographically close to each other. In
• 722 this way, they can reunite into a single unit should either
182 be attacked. Conversely, the violence pattern may also facil-
152 itate the separation of a large village into hostile groups that have no intention of reuniting: it permits suitable means for the temporary solution of a feud that will be carried to further ends after the two groups have separate gardens. The separation of the Monou-tedi from the Bisaasi-tedi is an example of the former, and the separation, at an earlier date, of both of these groups from the Patanowã-tedi is an example of the latter. Thus, while the bellicose behavior and values constrain co-residential groups to respond violently to affronts perpetrated on them by their co-villagers, their agricultural requirements can be accomodated by a graded system of violence that permits temporary solutions, albeit violent, while new gardens are cleared by the principals in a feud.

The politico-military situation in which the Patanowã-tedi found themselves during 1965 dramatically illustrates the importance of allies, i.e., neighbors upon whom one can depend for both military and subsistence items in times of crises. The Patanowã-tedi had been at war with a number of groups to their east and north for several years prior to my arrival in 1964. They managed, however, to hold their own in the wars against these villages, as they were a large group.[1] Earlier wars, and the latent hostilities resulting from these, precluded alliances with the Shamatari villages to their south. Their congeners, the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi, lived to the west of them, but the nature of the circumstances leading to their separation prevented alliances with these groups. Nevertheless, the Patanowã-tedi made peace overtures to the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi from time to time, and sporadic visiting between them began after 1955. In late 1964 the Patanowã-tedi managed to convince the Bisaasi-tedi of their sincerity to renew friendship and visited them, but the Monou-tedi shattered this attempted rapprochement by abducting seven women from the Patanowã-tedi. The events subsequent to this incident drew the Patanowã-tedi into yet another war, the proportions of which exceeded the defense capabilities of the Patanowã-tedi: they could no longer remain at one site and prosecute both wars effectively. They were surrounded on all

[1] They had attempted to split into three small groups before getting into the war with their northern and eastern neighbors, but the war forced the three groups to re-unite for defense purposes. See Chapter 5.

sides by villages that were actively raiding them. Fortunately, however, they had one ally, the Ashadowä-tedi, a large group (ca. 200-250 people) living two days' walk to their south. The Ashadowä-tedi allied themselves to the Patanowä-tedi because of their own interest in raiding the Hasaböwä-tedi, from whom they themselves separated on hostile terms in the recent past. Furthermore, the Ashadowä-tedi had penetrated Shamatari territory, and needed allies in the event that the Shamatari villages began hostilities against them.

The abduction of the seven Patanowä-tedi women by the Monou-tedi precipitated a war of such intensity that the Patanowä-tedi were immediately obliged to abandon their site. Under 'normal' circumstances, the Patanowä-tedi would have been able to resist a small group like the Monou-tedi, but their other war against the Hasaböwä-tedi detracted from their capacity to do so. When the Monou-tedi initiated raiding against the Patanowä-tedi, the allies of all the villages hostile to the Patanowä-tedi jumped, so to speak, on the 'band-wagon.' These allies were supporting Patanowä-tedi's enemies only half-heartedly up to the entry of the Monou-tedi into the war, for prior to this, the Patanowä-tedi were able to threaten these villages. When, however, the Monou-tedi and their allies (the Bisaasi-tedi, the Mõmaribõwei-tedi, and the Reyabobõwei-tedi) began raiding the Patanowä-tedi, it became immediately apparent that the offensive potential of the Patanowä-tedi was greatly reduced. Thus, villages at some distance from the Patanowä-tedi began to raid the latter,

726 +628 knowing that they would not be raided in return; the Patanowä-tedi simply could not conduct the war on that immense a scale. The participation of these peripheral villages in the war against the Patanowä-tedi conferred three advantages on them. First, the probability was good that they would benefit materially in the raiding by capturing women. Secondly, they demonstrated their solidarity to their allies at little cost or danger to themselves, thereby putting these allies under obligation to reciprocate the favor at a later time. Finally, the peripheral villages were able to demonstrate their ferocity to their neighbors by going to war, although the danger to themselves was almost negligible. In total, about 726 • 922 +628 36 24 a dozen villages began raiding the Patanowä-tedi in mid 1965, forcing them to abandon their garden before they could establish a new one elsewhere. The Patanowä-tedi had no alternative but to take refuge in the village of their allies, the Ashadowä-tedi. Without the aid of the Ashadowä-tedi, the Patanowä-tedi would have been forced to colonize from their single site and sustain very heavy losses from the incessant raids of their enemies. As the situation turned out, the Patanowä-tedi lost a large number of people in the raiding, despite having this ally, but the losses would have been much heavier without them.

162 582 [847] [83] **Summary**

The practice of female infanticide leads to a shortage of women. The Yanomamö attempt to overcome the shortage,

162 562 83 sexually, by the practices of sodomy, wife sharing, incest, and permitted affairs. However, two ways in which the problem 162 562 583 847 921 922 *628 is resolved--clandestine affairs within villages and raiding to abduct women between villages--create political situations that favor the development of political alliances for the purposes of defense. Since these involve the transfer of women between the allies, the practice of female infanticide constitutes a functional component in the marriage alliance system.

*621 *628 578 241 922 The process of village splitting, growing out of feuds over women, results in the establishment of small, militarily vulnerable villages. The timing of the split is conditioned by the agricultural requirements of the village on the one hand, and the nature of its politico-military relationships with other villages on the other. The graded system of violence permits flexibility in the settlement pattern and the precise conditions of a village split. Because the Yąnomamö rely heavily on cultivated foods, alliances may be interpreted as an attempt to maximize the chances of survival of groups of kinsmen as independent groups; the possibility always exists that a given group may be forced by its enemies to seek protection and provisions in the village of an ally.

*621 *628 602 121 122 internal feuding that promotes splitting, and threat of raids from other groups that inhibits village splitting and/or promotes the establishment of alliances with other groups. These two forces shape the composition and structure of Yąnomamö villages; that is, these two forces impinge on kinship relationships and together with these latter determine the nature of the Yąnomamö village.

*621 *628 122 I will show in Chapter V that larger villages fragment into smaller groups when internal feuding becomes particularly intense, but are occasionally forced to re-unite when warfare threatens the splinter groups. Yąnomamö villages would remain small if there were no military forces working on them. The Patanowë-tedi, for example, attempted to split into three groups after separating from the Bisaasi-tedi;[1] the three factions re-combined, however, when one of them was attacked by the Hasaböwë-tedi. Similarly, the non-Patanowë-tedi faction of the split (Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi) likewise split into smaller factions after the threat of raids from the outside subsided. Again, these recombined when threat of raids was imminent.

*621 582 Irrespective of the conditions of the splitting, the newly formed villages approximate a dual organization of inter-marrying moieties in structure. This form of organization is implicit in the Iroquois kinship terminology, sister exchange, and ambilateral cross-cousin marriage rules. Dual

[Box] *621

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[1] See Map C and Chapter V.

*628 [602] Lower Bisaasi-tedi gave its members refuge during the times when the Monou-tedi were threatened by raids from the Patanowä-tedi. The closest neighbor, geographically, to Lower Bisaasi-tedi [361] [613] is Upper Bisaasi-tedi (a mere 400 meters upstream), the dominant political group of that village being a segment of the Sha lineage. The two villages, however, behave quite independently in their alliance patterns. Lower Bisaasi-tedi's political interests are in the Mömariböwei-tedi at the present time, whereas Upper Bisaasi-tedi's interests are in the *628 726 Reyaboböwei-tedi, Karohi-tedi, and Widokaiya-tedi. In the war against the Patanowä-tedi, both the Lower and Upper Bisaasi-tedi aid the Monou-tedi by providing warriors for the raiding parties, and by giving refuge to the Monou-tedi when raiding is particularly intense.

*621 162 562 571 Lower Bisaasi-tedi is a cohesive, well-integrated, stable village. Much of the stability and cohesiveness derives from the fact that there is not a shortage of women and there are well-defined patterns of behavior for all members *628 • 722 vis-à-vis others. But, Lower Bisaasi-tedi is not a militarily viable group. It could not last long as an independent village if the warfare situation became intense; the group is not completely independent of the Upper Bisaasi-tedi village. At least once during my field work the Lower Bisaasi-tedi group coalesced with the Upper group when a raid from the Patanowä-tedi seemed imminent. And, if raiding from the Patanowä-tedi began, the group would have to merge with Upper Bisaasi-tedi for defense purposes. When I began my field work in 1964,

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*628 722 the Upper Bisaasi-tedi had a large village and two small villages. The two smaller villages were occupied by the two factions of the Upper group; the large village was unoccupied. It was used only when threat of raid existed, during which time the Lower Bisaasi-tedi re-joined their group and all moved into the large village. In 1965 the large village was rebuilt, but for the first time the Lower Bisaasi-tedi did not participate in the reconstruction of the common village. A few individuals who feared raids, however, did build a section in the village for themselves.

Lower Bisaasi-tedi, then, would re-unite with Upper Bisaasi-tedi in time of war, although each group pursues its own political ends and remains independent of the other in times of peace. One of the major reasons this is so can be explained in terms of the dyadic relationships discussed in [128] the last chapter. Figure 3 gives the simplified lineage structure of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, Lower Bisaasi-tedi, and *621 Monou-tedi. These three villages were one in 1954; Monou- *628 tedi split from the group to found their own village. In 578 1960 Upper Bisaasi-tedi and Lower Bisaasi-tedi split from each other, but remained geographically close to each other. The reasons given for the splits were that the groups were always fighting over women and, to reduce the frequency of club fighting, they simply parted before hostilities became intense. Even at the present time there is considerably more fighting in the village when the groups coalesce for defense [602] purposes. In terms of the kinship dyads, the problem can be [622]

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 131]

*621 It is more than coincidental that the composition of both
*628 Monou-tedi and Patanowä-tedi is more similar in terms of Sha
613 and Hor lineages than the similarity between any other two
602 Naomowei-tedi villages. Patanowä-tedi is merely an enlarged version of Monou-tedi in composition, there being more agnatic ties between these two groups in the Hor and Sha lineages than between any other pair of Namowei-tedi villages. Yet the hostilities between them are very intense.

*621 B. Village Size and Warfare
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Yąnomamö villages range in size from 40 to 250 individuals. Both limits are determined by the nature of Yąnomamö warfare, but the upper limit is set in large measure by the capacity of kinship and leadership to organize the internal affairs of the village. This capacity diminishes as village size increases.

*621 The largest Yąnomamö village for which I have complete
162 census data is Patanowä-tedi, a group comprising 212 indi-
* 722 viduals. The Patanowä-tedi assert that their southern neighbors and allies, the Ashadowä-tedi, are even more numerous, and that a number of Shamatari villages are, in turn, larger than Ashadowä-tedi. It is doubtful, however, that the numbers involved exceed 250 per village. Villages of this size, as we have mentioned for Patanowä-tedi, tend to fragment into smaller groups when threat of war subsides, and these smaller groups re-combine to form a larger village when warfare again threatens one or all of the colonies. The reason villages

*621 • 722 162 never get larger than 250 seems to lie in the fact that there is no military advantage to be gained in increasing village size beyond this point, while at the same time, further increase in size creates organizational difficulties that threaten the internal stability of the village.

*621 722 721 701 Size of raiding parties and tactics of warfare must be understood to appreciate why villages of 250 do not gain military advantages by increasing in size, and why village size can not drop below 40. The median size of Yąnomamö villages lies between 80 and 100 people. A village of this size can organize raiding parties ranging in size from about 20 to 30 men, as approximately one-third of the village residents are males between the ages of 14 and 50, the group from which the raiding parties are recruited. As no village leaves the women unguarded when it mounts a raid on its enemies, the size of raiding parties tends to be lower than the number of *621 162 eligible men able to raid.[1] Table 4 gives the population break-down of five Yąnomamö villages by age and sex. The males between the ages of 14 and 50 comprise 32.5% of the *621 701 721 population (19.6 plus 12.9). Thus, a raiding party comprised exclusively of men from a single village having a total population of 100 will not excede 33 men; but, the raiding party would include a large number of youths who have no raiding experience, and older men who are not able to move rapidly. These men constitute more of a handicap than an asset to the

[1]See Plate 2. [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 136]

Table 4: Age and Sex Distribution of the Yanomamö Population.[1]

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Frequency Distribution:						
	Age Intervals					
	0-5	6-13	14-25	26-50	51-75	Totals
Males	55	48	103	68	14	288
Females	36	42	77	60	23	238
Totals:	91	90	190	128	37	526

Percentage Distribution:						
	Age Intervals					
	0-5	6-13	14-25	26-50	51-75	Totals
Males	10.5	9.1	19.6	12.9	2.7	54.8
Females	6.8	8.0	14.6	11.4	4.4	45.2
Totals:	17.3	17.1	34.2	24.3	7.1	100.0

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[1] Based on residents of Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi, Patanowä-tedi, Mõmariböwei-tedi, and Reyaboböwei-tedi. I was not able to get age estimates on a number of individuals in Reyaboböwei-tedi and Patanowä-tedi, accounting for the difference in total population given in Table 5, Chapter IV. The sex ratio for the above population is 1.22, and male excess is 9.5%, compared to 1.19 and 8.35% in Table 5.

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effectiveness of the raiding party. As someone must stay home to guard the women, the guards usually come from the too young and too old. Usually, however, one or two '<u>waitedi</u>' (fierce ones), men who have a great deal of experience in warfare and who would bravely defend the village, also remain behind. Thus, a village of 100 people could, at best,

raided, the allies usually insist on returning home rather than pursue the enemy further. In 1965 a joint raid involving men from Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, Mõmaribõwei-tedi, and Reyabobõwei-tedi failed to locate the Patanowã-tedi at their village. The two Shamatari groups refused to go further in pursuit of the Patanowã-tedi, and the entire raiding party returned home, against the wishes of the Monou-tedi, whose dead headman was being avenged by this raid. Occasionally, however, the raiders are all enthusiastic about the raid and the possibility exists that an enraged raiding party may attempt to drive the enemy from the village. This partially accounts for the fact that warfare promotes the re-combination of smaller villages into larger, more defensible ones. If a raiding party of 60 men descended on the inhabitants of a village, the village could defend itself adequately only if there were approximately an equal number of adult men in the village. This would require that the village be at least as large as 180 people. Another factor, however, accounts for the fact that some villages have large populations. When a group has several enemies, it can raid them more effectively if it is able to send out raiding parties recruited from different factions within the village. The same raiders cannot return all the raids mounted against them and carry on the business of making a living as well. Again, larger numbers of men are required to defend the village while some of the men are away on raids, as the probability is higher that the village will be raided in the interim if the village has several enemies.

000 has several enemies.

*621 *628 701 721 • 722 [162] pointed out that Lower Bisaasi-tedi was not a militarily viable village, although its total population falls within the range of such villages. An examination of the village composition given in Appendix A will show that there are only 12 men between the ages of 14 and 50, and not all of these would be effective in a raiding party. Some of these men would have to remain home to guard the women, reducing the capability of the village to mount raids against enemies even more, as the size of the raiding party would have to be smaller than ten men. Thus, Lower Bisaasi-tedi depends on assistance from its allies in their warfare and could not survive as an independent village. Should their enemies (the Patanowä-tedi) begin raiding them frequently, they would have to reunite with their agnates, the Upper Bisaasi-tedi. As a matter of fact, they did exactly this whenever raids from the Patanowä-tedi threatened them. The [162] Monou-tedi have 21 males between the ages of 14 and 50, but two of these are cripples. Nevertheless, they are much more capable of maintaining a separate existence than the Lower Bisaasi-tedi, despite the fact that the difference in size of the two villages is not great. The significant fact is that they have a larger number of men capable of conducting raids. However, their size has not permitted them to effectively withstand the raids mounted against them by the [36] Patanowä-tedi, and the Monou-tedi were forced to move to a new site by the raids stemming from their enemies. Without the

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*621 aid of allies such as the two Bisaasi-tedi groups, the Monou-
*722 tedi probably could not survive as an independent village
*628 because of the size differential between themselves and their
*621 enemies. It is noteworthy, however, that the Monou-tedi are
722 more independent than the Lower Bisaasi-tedi, for they moved
361 to a new site rather than recombine (permanently) with their
*628 agnates in Bisaasi-tedi. This avoidance pattern is not a probable alternative for the Lower Bisaasi-tedi because of their relative lack of potential to conduct effective warfare, even considering the fact that their allies would aid them. Lower Bisaasi-tedi would invite raiding by mo[illegible]ther away from Upper Bisaasi-tedi, as their erstwhile neighbors and allies, from whom they have managed to obtain so many women, would be more equal in strength and would demand more women from them. Or, other neighbors, such as the Widokaiya-tedi, would descend on them hoping to abduct women, of which the Lower Bisaasi-tedi have many. They have managed to obtain these women from a position of strength, but a large factor in their strength is the fact that they are still dependent on Upper Bisaasi-tedi. Without the latter, they would be in a serious military situation.

Summary

*621 578 562 602 583 Village splitting develops out of feuding over women; the kinship lines along which villages split reflect the strength of the tie linking descent groups to each other by marriage or promises to exchange women, while at the same time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

000 time illustrates the weakness of the agnatic bonds.

*621 *623 618 *722 583 When villages split, large lineages are redistributed by local descent group affiliation among the several newly established villages. These new groups tend to be quite small, but never fall below a population size of about 40 people for reasons having to do with the successful conduct of raiding. These small villages tend to approximate a dual organization of intermarrying local descent groups. Newly formed villages enter into military alliances with other villages and exchange women with them. Over time, such exchanges alter the homogeneity of the respective villages and promote the development of new lineage segments within each village. As the village grows in size and as new segments emerge over time, internal village stability reduces and the village then splits again. Village splitting is frequently delayed or inhibited by the existence of an active group of enemies, and even after such a split the newly-established villages may reunite when threat of raid is imminent. When military pressures decrease, the village again fragments into smaller groups. The minimum size of these groups is set by the number of adult men required to effectively conduct raiding. It appears that these small villages would fragment into even smaller groups if warfare were to cease.

10:Chagnon E-4.5 (1964-1966) 1967 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

CHAPTER V

THE HISTORY OF FIVE YĄNOMAMÖ VILLAGES

I shall briefly outline in this chapter the history of the movements of Bisaasi-tedi, Monou-tedi, Patanowẽ-tedi, Mąmaribŏwei-tedi and Reyabobŏwei-tedi, including those movements during the fifteen-month period (November 1964 through February 1966) covered by my field work. The historical data I collected on village movements enable me to discuss the village histories from about 1875 to the present.

The first three of the above-mentioned groups lived together at one time and the present residents of these villages are closely related. The last site they occupied as one village was called Namowei-tedi, and for sake of simplicity I adopt this name in the discussion of their movements up to that point in time. Similarly, the last two villages of the five mentioned above have a common history, being called Paruritawẽ-tedi immediately prior to their splitting in 1960.

I wish to make several points in the discussion that follows. The histories indicate (1) that villages move only when forced to do so by raids from other villages; (2) that villages are structurally unstable and tend to split into factions because of internal disputes; (3) that the newly-established cognate villages frequently enter into hostilities with each other; and (4) that it is necessary to know the

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historical relationships between villages to properly interpret marriage ties between them. With regard to the last point, I found that numerous individuals in Bisaasi-tedi claimed to be from Patanowä-tedi; my initial conclusions concerning their marriage to individuals from Bisaasi-tedi was that the marriages were village-exogamic. I was obliged to reassess these marriages after I learned that the two villages were at one time one village, and most of the marriages between the two groups were contracted while the groups were living together. I therefore investigated in detail the historical relationships between all the villages in the Mavaca area, a portion of the results constituting the subject of this chapter.

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I have summarized the village movements in Tables 5 and 6 and have indicated these movements graphically on Map C. The reader may, if he wishes, skip the details of the histories and turn at this point to the concluding remarks of this chapter. I can make the four points by using only Tables 5 and 6, in conjunction with Map C. However, I cannot illustrate Yanomamö political behavior without recourse to details of the village movements and the wars that caused them and, accordingly, I include the details of the histories in this chapter. The political relationships that presently obtain between the two Shamatari villages (Mömariböwei-tedi and Reyaboböwei-tedi) and their allies, the Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, can not be completely understood without knowing their respective histories in some detail. Most of the

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174 175 *628 *621 descent back to Shamatari ancestors. ShihowÃ-tedi and its splinter village, MokayÃaba-tedi, were two Shamatari allies of the Namowei-tedi in this period of the latter's history.

174 175 *628 721 583 The Namowei-tedi got into a war with a cluster of villages allied to ObotawÃ-tedi over a woman from the latter village. The woman joined the Namowei-tedi against the wishes of her own people. This led to a club fight between the two groups and, later, to a shooting war. ObotawÃ-tedi recruited aid from their allies, the BokçoiwÃ-Urihi-tedi, Boreta-tedi, and Aramata-tedi while the Namowei-tedi were supported by the two Shamatari villages mentioned above. A number of men from each of the two groups were killed in the raiding that developed and several Namowei-tedi women were abducted. ObotawÃ-tedi and their allies forced Namowei-tedi to abandon their garden and take refuge with the Wareta-tedi, a group that had just abandoned the area (ca. 1890-1900) occupied by the Namowei-tedi because of a war with the Boreta-tedi. As the Namowei-tedi had not had time to make a new garden when the raiding became intense enough to force them to move, they moved into the village of Wareta-tedi and lived off the produce of the latter's garden.

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Area 2: Wareta-tedi

174 *628 726 The residents of Wareta-tedi had their own war with ShihowÃ-tedi when they were joined by the Namowei-tedi, but were on friendly terms with HusirawÃ-urihi-tedi, a village to their north. The headman of Wareta-tedi, ShamaiyowÃ,

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[Namowei-tedi Group]

The headman of Wareta-tedi, Shamaiyowä, and some of his kinsmen went to visit their allies on the latter's invitation, but Husirawä's group treacherously killed Shamaiyowä and two of his followers. Not wanting to participate in the raiding against their old allies, the Namowei-tedi established a new garden and moved away from the Wareta-tedi. A number of individuals in the present populations of Patanowä-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi trace descent back to the headman of Wareta-tedi, as the latter had demanded women in return for his protection. In ca. 1910 the Namowei-tedi moved to their new garden at Namowei.

Area 3: Namowei-tedi

This area is quite mountanous and the group took its name from one of the ranges, Namowei-kähö--"sharpness." They lived here long enough to make three different gardens (Makei, Shodemi, and Amatakö), but ultimately were forced to abandon the area because of renewed raiding from their old enemies, the Boreta-tedi. Having no friends to the north and several old enemies to the east, the Namowei-tedi moved west and established their garden at Hąhoyaoba-täka in ca. 1920.

Area 4: Hąhoyaoba-tedi

The old allies of the Namowei-tedi, the Wareta-tedi, were forced to abandon their site and move west. They settled in the area immediately south of the Namowei-tedi, splitting into two villages (Hasaböwä-tedi and Ashadowä-tedi), and continued to remain on good terms with the Namowei-tedi.

where. In 1949 they moved from Shihota-tëka to Kreibëwei, a garden on the Shamata-u branch of the Mavaca River.

(3) The Wanidima-tedi began to split into three groups in the mid '50s: Rashawë and Waiyari were the two new gardens established by the factions of Wanidima-tedi. The separation was actually completed in so far as each garden was being exploited by one of the factions, but the three factions were forced to reunite when one of them got into a war with several villages from the north side of the Orinoco. The three groups abandoned their gardens and returned to Patanowë-tëka, and became known as the Patanowë-tedi.

The war with the villages north of the Orinoco started when Yabitawë-tedi and Kashorawë-tedi men killed a man from Boreta-tedi in a club fight. The headman of Mahekodo-tedi, Shinanokawë, was married to the sisters of the Boreta-tedi man, and began raiding the Yabitawë-tedi to avenge his death. A man from Patanowë-tedi was doing bride service in the latter village and was killed by raiders from Mahekodo-tedi, involving the Patanowë-tedi in the war against Mahekodo-tedi. Shortly after this event, men from Yabitawë-tedi visited Patanowë-tedi and, finding the men gone, seized a young girl who was in puberty seclusion. The Patanowë-tedi then began raiding the Yabitawë-tedi, forcing them to take refuge with their allies, the Kashorawë-tedi. Hasabëwë-tedi, then an ally to both Patanowë-tedi and Yabitawë-tedi, took the side of the latter in the dispute and commenced to raid

the Patanowä-tedi.[1] Thus, the Patanowä-tedi were surrounded on all sides by enemies; only one village, Ashadowä-tedi, remained on friendly terms with them. Beyond the Ashadowä-tedi were the Shamatari villages, bitter enemies of the Patanowä-tedi since the killing of Ruwahiwä.

By the time the Patanowä-tedi had gotten into this situation, the war with their agnates had subsided. So the Patanowä-tedi moved west, into the area abandoned by their agnates, whence they harried the Hasaböwä-tedi and the groups north of the Orinoco. They attempted with some success to effect a rapprochement with their agnates, and a few individuals from the Kreiböwei-tedi group visited the Patanowä-tedi. One of these individuals was able to obtain a wife in Patanowä-tedi, whom he subsequently took back to Monou-tedi with him.

The Patanowä-tedi are presently living between two sites: Patanowä-tëka and Shamata-tëka, a situation forced on them by the hostile relationships they have with all their neighbors except the Ashadowä-tedi.

Area 6: Shihota-tëka

See "Area 5" point (2) above.

Area 7: Kreiböwei-tedi

This site was established in 1949. After fleeing from Shihota to avoid the raids of the Patanowä-tedi, the

[1] At this point the Patanowä-tedi returned to Patanowä-tëka from their three sites of Wanidima, Waiyari, and Rashawä.

[Namowei-tedi Group]

Kreibŏwei population was in need of an ally to aid them in their raids against Patanowĕ-tedi. Shortly after they moved to Kreibŏwei they made friendly contact with a Shamatari village, then under the leadership of Riakowĕ, located on the Mavaca River. The Kreibŏwei-tedi began visiting Riakowĕ's village and entered into feasting relationships with his followers.

Riakowĕ's followers were related to the Shamatari with whom the Kreibŏwei-tedi were at war: Sibarariwĕ's village. Sibarariwĕ persuaded Riakowĕ to invite the Kreibŏwei-tedi to a feast during which the two Shamatari groups planned to kill as many men as they could and abduct women. By doing this Sibarariwĕ would avenge the murder of his older brother, Ruwahiwĕ, who was treacherously killed about 10 years earlier by the Kreibŏwei-tedi, when the latter lived at Patanowĕ-tĕka.

The Kreibŏwei-tedi accepted the feast invitation and went to Riakowĕ's village in the dry season (i.e., December through March) of 1950-51. Sibarariwĕ's followers, along with a party of men from Hasabŏwĕ-tedi, were concealed in the jungle outside Riakowĕ's village. Shortly after arriving at the village, the Kreibŏwei-tedi men were attacked by Riakowĕ's men with sharpened staves and axes, and eleven of them were killed. Those that managed to break out of the palisades were shot from ambush by Sibarariwĕ's followers, along with the Hasabŏwĕ-tedi, resulting in the wounding of a large number of Kreibŏwei-tedi men. Only six or seven women were seized by the Shamatari; but, the greediness of the Shamatari

[Namowei-tedi Group]

Area 9: Kobou-tëka

The Kreibŏwei-tedi parted with their protectors as soon as this garden began producing. They lived at this site only long enough to complete their two new gardens at Monou and Barawë, moving into the latter when they, in turn, began producing. "Kobou" in Yanomamŏ means "let it go at that," or, in more vernacular terms, "to hell with that garden." Kobou was abandoned shortly after it was made, having served as a temporary base for the Kreibŏwei-tedi while they completed their split. It would not have been necessary to complete the splitting of the village by making two new gardens had there been no war with the Shamatari. But, as one faction of the group made their garden elsewhere, the others were reluctant to remain at Kobou and bear the brunt of the revenge raids from the Shamatari. Thus, they too made a new garden. Again, it would not have been necessary to make Kobou-tëka had Mahekodo-tedi been a dependable ally. But as the Kreibŏwei-tedi suspected that their erstwhile protectors were plotting against them, they followed that course of action most expedient at the time. As they had already started Kobou, it was simply more practicable to complete that garden and move out of Mahekodo-tedi as soon as possible, rather than begin making two gardens and delay their move until these gardens began producing.

Areas 10 and 11: Monou-tedi and Barawë-tedi

After separating into two groups the Kreibŏwei-tedi

remained on good terms with each other. Their split occurred in 1954, perhaps a year earlier.

When I initiated my field work in 1964 Monou-tëka was still occupied, but its population, the Monou-tedi, was in the process of making a new garden (Moyanabŏwei) west of Monou to avoid the raids of the Patanowë-tedi, with whom they had entered into a new war in 1964.

The faction that moved to Barawë remained at that site about five years. They moved to the mouth of the Mavaca River, taking the name Bisaasi-tedi, in 1959, splitting into two villages, each located on opposite banks of the Mavaca River. By 1958 the Venezuelan Government had initiated a malaria-control program in this area of Amazonas and had established a small field station at the mouth of the Mavaca River. Venezuelans associated with this field station invited the Barawë-tedi to move to the Mavaca River; the Indians accepted the invitation, hoping to gain access to steel tools. This was the beginning of contact with outsiders for the Kreibŏwei-tedi; prior to 1959 the only foreigners they had known were the missionary at Mahekodo-tedi, James P. Barker, and the members of the Frobenius Institute Expedition, Meinhard Schuster and Otto Zerries, who they visited occasionally at Mahekodo-tedi.

Area 12: Bisaasi-tedi

The Bisaasi-tedi began friendly contacts with a Shamatari village, Paruritawë-tedi, after they moved to the mouth of the Mavaca River.

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

Area 1: Aramamisi-kähö

Matakuwë's group settled here after abandoning their site north of the Orinoco because of wars with Kayabawë's group. The village at Aramamisi-kähö, according to my informants (who could not possibly have remembered it from childhood), was immense. As the populations of the present villages of Yeisi-tedi, Nakiaiyoaba-tedi, Aramamisi-tedi, Konabuma-tedi,[1] Iwahikoroba-tedi, Akawaiyoba-tedi, Möwëraoba-tedi, Karawatari-urihi-tedi, Warabawë-tedi, Kohoroshi-tedi, Möxmariböwei-tedi, and Reyaboböwei-tedi trace their origins to this single village, we must conclude that the village was indeed large in 1900.

A large segment of the population broke away from the main group and moved to the Rahuawë-u River, splitting into two groups after reaching that area. Their separation from the Aramamisi-kähö population developed out of a feud over a woman within the village, and the feud escalated to mutual raiding after the separation was completed. The splinter group entered into friendly relationships with the Namowei-tedi and were their allies until about 1935, when a war between them broke out. The present villages of Konabuma-tedi, Yeisi-tedi, Nakiaiyoaba-tedi, and Akawaiyoba-tedi are derived from the original faction that separated from Matakuwë's group. The first three of these groups presently live in the Shukumöna-u basin, while the last one lives in the area abandoned by the

[1] There were two distinct Shamatari villages that had the name Konabuma-tedi.

others. Matakuwë's group was being raided by Kayabawë's followers and by the splinter group that separated from Aramamisi-këkö. These raids forced Matakuwë and his followers to abandon Aramamisi-këkö and settle at Shirakoböwei. This move took place about 1900, perhaps a few years later.

Area 2: Shirakoböwei

Matakuwë's followers established several sites in this area, as they were harried by the raids from Kayabawë's followers. An internal village feud developed between the factions led respectively by Karehewë and Orakawë. During the fighting a young man from Karehewë's group was killed with a spear, and Karehewë moved to the Mavaca basin. Karehewë's followers raided the group at Shirakoböwei, and the latter reciprocated, forcing Karehewë to move further north. Karehewë's son, Riakowë, became headman of this village and played host to the 1950 treacherous feast in which the Kreiböwei-tedi lost a large number of men. This village is presently called Iwahikoroba-tedi, and is led by Riakowë's son, Börösöwë. In 1965 rumors reached the Bisaasi-tedi that Iwahikoroba-tedi had split into two factions, both moving down the Mavaca River. In September 1965 I attempted unsuccessfully to make the first contact with this group, but my guides forced me to turn back when we began seeing signs (bridges and trails) made by Börösöwë's group. They feared Börösöwë would kill us.

Another faction, led by Waiyahowë, split off from

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

174 121 361 [731] Matakuwë's group and returned to the Orinoco River area. An epidemic later decimated this small group and the survivors were absorbed by other villages.

Finally, Matakuwë and his group separated from Orakawë and his faction and, in about 1910, settled in the Mavaca basin. The group that remained at Shirakoböwei retained the name Aramamisi-tedi. They later moved back toward the Orinoco River and are presently in that area.

Matakuwë and his followers separated from Orakawë's group for two reasons. First, Matakuwë decided to support Karehewë in the dispute over the death of a member of the [922] latter's group. Secondly, Matakuwë and his faction wanted to escape the raiding from the Shihowë-tedi, who continued [628] to harrass them. By taking the side of Karehewë, Matakuwë [926] and his faction entered into hostilities with Orakawë's group and, as soon as the two groups separated, they began raiding each other.

Area 3: Boraböwei

174 195 361 628 602 726 241 Matakuwë and his followers moved here about 1910. Raids mounted on them by their agnates, the Aramamisi-tedi, forced them to make a new garden at Konabuma, and for a number of years Matakuwë's group lived alternatively between these two sites. Another garden was established at Kaurewë after the raiding intensified; one raid on them by the Aramamisi-tedi resulted in the destruction of their garden at Boraböwei, and Matakuwë's group fled to Kayurewë, temporarily abandoning Konabuma.

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

000 rarily abandoning Konabuma.

174 Matakuwë's group had three factions. Oroshowë, a
175 man belonging to Matakuwë's faction, took a woman away from
*621
578 her husband, a man from Karawatari's faction, leading to an
361 internal feud. One man of Karawatari's faction was shot, and
Karawatari split from the main group to establish a village
of his own on the Shukumõna-u River. This split took place
174 about 1925. Karawatari's group began raiding Matakuwë's vil-
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*621 lage to avenge the death of Biawawë, the man killed in the
172 feud. Karawatari's village later split for reasons I was un-
174 able to determine, and two factions separated from Karawatari's
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*621 group to found their own villages: Warabawë-tedi, led by
361 Hewariwë, and Kohoroshi-tedi, led by Ohiriwë. These last two
[622]
[777] villages are presumed to be in Brazil at the present time,
as my informants assert that Kohoroshi-tedi includes bearded
foreigners among its members, most probably Salesian Mis-
361 sionaries on the Cauabury River.[1] In 1964 Karawatari's group
[574] lived on the Shukumõna-u River, as men from Reyabobõwei-tedi
*[628] danced there that year. When the Reyabobõwei-tedi left
[772] Karawatari's village, they took a young woman (Dimorama) with
them, thereby becoming enemies to Karawatari. The girl
presently lives in Bisaasi-tedi.

174 In about 1935 Matakuwë and his group moved to Kayurewë
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922 to avoid raids from Karawatari and the Aramamisi-tedi.

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*[628] [1]Warabawë-tedi, a part of Kohoroshi-tedi in 1934, and Karawatari's villagers were involved in the abduction of Nabëyoma.

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

Area 4: Kayurewä

174 175 +628 926 861 The Aramamisi-tedi continued to raid Matakuwä's group at Kayurewä, so this site was abandoned in about 1940. Matakuwä's group had gotten into a war with the Namowei-tedi by 1940 over the death of Ruwahiwä, who was killed while he visited the Namowei-tedi at Patanowä-tëka. Ruwahiwä was Matakuwä's eldest son. After this incident, the Namowei-tedi actively raided Matakuwä's group at Kayurewä, and abducted a large number of women from them. Being raided by two villages, Matakuwä moved back to Konabuma, where his group had previously lived, because the peach palms of that garden were still producing.

Area 5: Konabuma

+174 +621 361 About 5 years after this site was reoccupied by Matakuwä's group, the group split into two villages. One of [622] them continued to live at Konabuma, and was led by Matakuwä's [101] son, Sibarariwä. The other group moved to a branch of the Shukumöna-u River and took the name Paruritawä-tedi, led by [578] Weiamamowä. The split at Konabuma was caused by an internal [721] feud over a woman. A club fight temporarily settled the dispute, but after the groups separated, they began raiding each other.

174 36 +628 722 175 Sibarariwä's group remained at Konabuma for a short time after the Paruritawä-tedi separated from them, but raids from the Namowei-tedi, the Armamisi-tedi and the Paruritawä-tedi themselves forced Sibarariwä's group to abandon Konabuma

and move to Kakamoba. This site was occupied for just a few years, and by 1950 Sibarariwä's group was living at Amąrokobö-wei: the 1950 treacherous feast for the Kreiböwei-tedi was conducted while Sibarariwä's group was here. After 1950 Sibarariwä's group fled south to avoid the raids of the survivors of that treacherous feast, establishing the garden of Dądamoböwei. This garden was abandoned because of raids mounted by the Paruritawä-tedi, and Sibarariwä returned to Amąrokoböwei about 1955. The Paruritawä-tedi eventually became friendly to Sibarariwä's group and were able to lure some of them, at the instigation of the Monou-tedi and Bisaasi-tedi, to a treacherous feast in 1960, during which three men were murdered and four women captured. In 1964 Sibarariwä's group moved to the headwaters of the Mavaca River, being known as the Möwäraoba-tedi. Monou-tedi and Mąmariböwei-tedi sent a raiding party against them at this location about the time I started my field work, and killed one man.

Area 6: Paruritawä-tedi

The Paruritawä-tedi made friendly contact with the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi about 1960, and have entered into alliance with these groups. The Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi persuaded the Paruritawä-tedi to invite members of Sibarariwä's group to a feast in 1960 and, with the aid of the Paruritawä-tedi, murdered three men and seized four women. Sibarariwä's group avenged this by mounting raids

[Paruritawä-tedi Group]

against the Paruritawä-tedi, and the latter abandoned their site and moved north. When they abandoned Paruritawä-tedi, the group split into two factions, each making a separate garden: Mömariböwei and Reyaboböwei. The two factions are still on friendly terms with each other and both are allied to the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi. The Reyaboböwei-tedi are presently attempting rapprochement with Sibarariwä's group, and are being forced by their allies, the Monou-tedi and the Bisaasi-tedi, to use their newly established friendship to effect another treacherous feast. In February 1965 the Reyaboböwei-tedi succeeded in inviting Sibarariwä's entire village to a feast and were intending to trick them after they arrived. However, one of the individuals met Sibarariwä's group half-way and warned them of the treachery, frustrating the attempt by the Bisaasi-tedi, the Monou-tedi, and the Paruritawä-tedi to get their revenge on Sibarariwä's group.

C. The War Pattern From November 1964 to February 1966

The effects of raiding and internal feuds on village composition, stability, splitting, and relocation that I have described above may also be observed among these villages at the present time. Raiding was intense during my field work. Patanowä-tedi, for example, was raided at least 25 times while I was in the field, raids that were mounted by a dozen different villages. Not all the raids were successful, but the frequency of the raiding was so high that it was never safe for the Patanowä-tedi to venture away from the village.

721 The major effect of these raids, apart from the ten lives
* 722 they claimed, was that the PatanowÃ-tedi had to move fre-
361 quently from one site to another. The Monou-tedi, who were raiding the PatanowÃ-tedi, were being raided intensively also. They, too, had to move frequently to avoid the raids. Both
*[628] groups had to rely on allies to give them refuge during the
[132] dry season, the time of the year when raiding is most intense.
[221] It will be apparent below how crucial allies are to villages
[241] that are being raided frequently, and how agricultural
721 practices necessitate these allies. Finally, the events
602 discussed below will illustrate the degree to which consan-
*628 guineal ties between mutually hostile villages are able to mitigate the hostilities between these villages.

*628 The war between Monou-tedi and
722 PatanowÃ-tedi

*[621] After the Namowei-tedi group split at the site of
[361] PatanowÃ in the early '40s, the two factions entered into a period of hostility that lasted until one of the factions, the present groups of Bisaasi-tedi and Monou-tedi, moved out of the area. Raiding between the two factions ceased after 1950, and each group entered into political alliances with unrelated neighboring villages.

728 In the middle '50s, a rapprochement between the two
* 624 factions was attempted. A few individuals from Monou-tedi
628 began visiting PatanowÃ-tedi, and one of them, TorokoiwÃ, was
[58] given two wives by the PatanowÃ-tedi. The rapprochement, how-
[583] ever, was never effected and the political relationships between

628 721 the Patanowä-tedi for managing to overwhelm their own force led them to declare war on the Patanowä-tedi. The Monou-tedi 722 241 726 immediately began making a new garden at Moyenaböwei, across the Mavaca River from their village and several hours inland, anticipating the war that they knew would follow. After they had cleared the large trees from their new garden site, they raided the Patanowä-tedi in the last week of January 1965, and succeeded in killing Bosibrei.

727 581 582 593 628 Another important event took place while the Monou-tedi were clearing the trees from their new garden site, an event that illustrates the same principle of political philosophy. One of the stolen women, Kakoma, was given to a young man, Karidimö, who had only one leg. Karidimö could not do heavy work, and when his village moved inland to clear their new site Karidimö moved to Bisaasi-tedi with his new wife. Kakoma, however, was not pleased with her new husband, and asked the Bisaasi-tedi if she could stay with them, hoping that she would be permitted to rejoin the Patanowä-tedi if they returned to Bisaasi-tedi to visit. The Bisaasi-tedi men obligingly took her away from Karidimö by force and gave her to a bachelor in their own village. Karidimö, enraged at this, returned to Monou-tedi to recruit aid.

628 721 578 This put the Monou-tedi in a difficult position. They were planning to raid the Patanowä-tedi and would have to maintain good relations with the Bisaasi-tedi if the revenge raids from the Patanowä-tedi became intense. They could not, however, overlook the insult to Karidimö, for this

726 the men left on the raid. One faction of Bisaasi-tedi did
[122] not participate in the raid in order to protect the women while the others were gone.

The raiding party left on the 21st and returned on
[361] the 2nd of May. They killed one Patanowä-tedi at Shihota, a site abandoned in 1949 by the Bisaasi-tedi now being used by the Patanowä-tedi. The Patanowä-tedi chased the raiders, outflanking them at one point, and shot one of the Monou-tedi, badly wounding him. The man, Konoreiwä, was pierced with a bamboo point just above his heart. Although the tip of the point protruded out his back, he recovered.

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[32] The Patanowä-tedi could not avenge this killing until the rains subsided. Accordingly, the Monou-tedi returned to their own village after they retreated to Bisaasi-tedi on May 2. They remained in their village until June 20, at which time they rejoined the Bisaasi-tedi; they did so because travel through the jungle was becoming possible by that date, as the rains subsided early in 1965. On July 10 the Bisaasi-tedi and the Monou-tedi, assisted by their allies, the Mõmaribõwei-tedi and Reyabobõwei-tedi, raided the Patanowä-tedi again, leaving from Bisaasi-tedi. The raid proved to be unsuccessful, as the Patanowä-tedi had moved into the village of their only ally, the Ashadowä-tedi. All the raiders except those from Monou-tedi wanted to turn back, as the trail to Ashadowä-tedi was a poor one and retreat would have been difficult. The raiding party did turn back, but the Monou-tedi were angry with their allies for forcing them to

they have, but they must revenge raids coming from Bisaasi-tedi. Now that Paruriwä and his followers have moved away from Kaobäwä's group, the Patanowä-tedi can raid Paruriwä without having to 'look twice' before shooting. As Paruriwä's faction is a small one, it is vulnerable; one raid from the Patanowä-tedi will force it to rejoin Kaobäwä's group. The internal stability of the reunited groups will suffer if this happens, as Paruriwä will be obliged to demonstrate his leadership capacity. This will involve making an issue out of an incident that probably would have been overlooked prior te the separation of the two groups, and internal friction will be high.

The split within Patanowä-tedi

The incessant raiding from Hasaböwä-tedi, Kashorawä-tedi, Yabitawä-tedi, Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi and their respective allies brought about a high degree of tension among the Patanowä-tedi. It was not safe to leave the village at any time. The Patanowä-tedi had attempted to split into three groups several years earlier, as the population had reached a large size and internal fighting was a nuisance. The development of the war with the Hasaböwä-tedi forced them to reunite. Factionalism, however, was pronounced within the village, and the added tension brought about by the new war with Monou-tedi, Bisaasi-tedi and the latter's two Shamatari allies ultimately led to an internal split within Patanowä-tedi a month before I left the field.

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[128] **Summary**

Tables 5 and 6 broadly summarize the movements of the five villages. As the details of the text indicate, considerably more village movement goes on than can be included in tables of this sort. The micro-movements, however, merely express in greater detail what is immediately apparent from an examination of Tables 5 and 6: the Yanomamö abandon their gardens and move to new locations because of raids from other groups. In only one instance was the movement of a village stimulated by economic considerations: site 4 was abandoned by the Namowei-tedi because of poor soil. Another exception was the abandoning of Barawä (site 10) by the Bisaasi-tedi in 1959. They moved to the mouth of the Mavaca River to gain access to steel tools, marking the beginning of their sustained contact with foreigners.

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772 The tables also show that there were ten village splits relevant to explaining the origins of the five villages considered in this chapter. Five of these splits were due to feuds over women. In four of the cases the factions that were involved immediately entered into hostilities with each other. The recent split within Patanowä-tedi, discussed in the text (pp. 188-89), again over a woman, is not included in Table 5, as the refugee group did not form a new village of their own. Three village splits in Tables 5 and 6 developed out of minor feuds, usually over women, brought about by large village size. In one case, the factions ultimately entered into hostilities with each other, whereas in two cases the factions still remain on friendly terms.

occupying five different sites, each having its own house and garden. These five groups recombined into a single unitary village only when warfare threatened. To the southwest of the Uraricaá area, in the headwaters of the Parima River, the villages tend to be larger and more nucleated. On the Upper Parima River villages have a permanent centralized site to which the dispersed extended families may retreat when raids are imminent. Warfare is more common in this area than on the Uraricaá. The Parima Mountains separate this group of Yąnomamö from those whose social organization is described in this thesis. Southwest of the Parima Mountains intensity of warfare is similar to that found in the Mavaca basin. Corresponding to this increase in intensity is a change in type of settlement: palisaded villages are general southwest of the Parima Mountains, whereas they are found only sporadically or not at all to the northeast.

There is likewise an apparent cline in population density isomorphic with the cline in warfare intensity. Yąnomamö villages in Brazil are progressively smaller and more widely scattered as one proceeds northeastward from the Parima Mountains. It is tempting to correlate the reduction in warfare intensity with the demographic pattern. However, another factor complicates the picture: the Yąnomamö have more contact with other tribes (Makiritare and Arekuna) in the northeast extension of their territory; in many cases they live in the same villages with these tribes. I suspect that the contact they have with the Carib-speaking groups also

114 121 602 Among the Yąnomamö consanguineal kinship does not have the quality attributed to kinship in general by Fortes, and we therefore cannot explain the stability that exists in terms of these alleged properties. The fact that affinal ties do promote a certain amount of stability between Yąnomamö descent groups supports Leach's arguments, and, for the reasons implied by Leach: Yąnomamö marriages occur within a political context that promotes military obligations and concomitants not predictable from first principles regarding the putative nature of kinship itself. Descent groups exchange [613] [513] [582] [722] [681] women with an eye toward maximizing military advantage in a milieu of hostile political relationships. The stability brought about by such marriages is, therefore, largely a function of the politico-military ends served by marriage and is only tangentially, if at all, a result of kinship.

121 I would also like to discuss the nature of the relationship between corporation and descent from another point of view, for the nature of the estate of the Yąnomamö descent corporation gives a particular quality to the corporation. Most corporate lineal descent groups have as one of their major functions the control over and disposition of property. The property is usually real property. Pastoralists, of course, have as their estates, herds and use rights to forage areas. Some Northwest Coast and northern California tribes have corporate groups whose estates are acorn groves and portions of salmon streams.

In addition to real property, corporate groups

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

a newly planted sucker, the more quickly it will bear fruit. Hence, if the Yąnomamö wish to establish a garden that will produce a crop in the shortest period of time, they must plant large cuttings. These can weigh up to 10 pounds each, and transportation of the cuttings becomes a tremendous task.

As will be made clear later, most long moves are usually stimulated by warfare, and the group is under some pressure to establish a new garden as quickly as possible. The Yąnomamö can speed up their schedule of abandoning an area by taking temporary refuge in the village of an ally, by planting crops other than plantains that mature quickly and produce high yields, or by anticipating a serious war and getting an early start on their new garden. When Kąobawä's group was forced to abandon one of its locations because of a war, the group took refuge with an ally and established its new garden near the ally's village. One of the consequences of these factors is that newly established gardens produce their crops in cycles so that there will be periods of plenty interrupted by periods of hunger. After a few years, the garden will mature and produce constantly. The periods of hunger are eased by planting rapidly developing crops such as maize and by working constantly at transplanting the secondary plantain shoots as they appear. Thus, gardening activities vary largely with the relative maturity of the garden and the length of time the people have been living at that site. Once the plantains are producing constantly, other crops are not cultivated as intensively as before. But whatever the Yąnomamö are eating in a given village, they are striving to get their gardens to produce a constant supply of plantains. The fact that a given village may be relying very heavily on maize at some point in time may reflect no more than the fact that the garden is relatively new and the plantains have not yet begun producing constantly.

After a site has been occupied a few years, gardening activities take on a more regular pattern. The "rectum" (*bei kä bosi*) of the garden is gradually abandoned, and a new "nose" (*bei kä bushibö*) is added by clearing adjacent land and transplanting crops. Thus, a garden has a direction—it moves, little by little. Sometimes there will be as many as three or four discrete gardens around a village, all of them producing more or less continuously. The older ones are gradually abandoned because it is simply easier to clear new land than to attempt to weed the thorny underbrush out of the old site. If you have ever attempted to clear prickly brush without wearing protective clothing, you should immediately see the wisdom of the Yąnomamö choice.

In an established garden site, labor follows a more regular pattern. The dry season is usually the time for feasting, visiting, trading, and warfare. Gardening activities are at a minimum at this time of year, but the ambitious will try to work a few hours each day at weeding, transplanting, and burning brush. Most of the heavy labor of felling large trees is restricted to the wet season, when it is cloudy and generally cooler, and the demands of feasting and dancing do not interfere with the work. Still, practical considerations are more important than a fixed schedule of work, and if the gardens are producing insufficient quantities of food, the Yąnomamö will expand their gardens at any time of the year.

GARDEN PRODUCTS Each man's garden contains three or four varieties of both plantains and bananas. The larger portion of the cultivated land will contain plantains, as they produce a higher yield than bananas. The garden will also have a sizeable patch of sweet manioc, a root crop that is boiled or refined into a rough flour by grinding it on a rock and then converting the flour into thick, round cakes of baked cassava bread.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

guishing feature that sets it aside from other groups of Yąnomamö. Many wild plants are also said to have magical properties.

CONCLUSION The Yąnomamö have adapted to their jungle environment with a very simple technology. Exploiting both the naturally occurring foods and domesticated crops is relatively easy with this technology, and the resources of both the jungle and the garden provide the people with the two basic necessities of life: food and shelter. Although the resources are extremely varied and numerous, the diet is largely dominated by one food item: plantains. Techniques of manufacturing are so simple and direct that each individual can produce any item he needs from the resources immediately around him. The material aspect of the culture is decidedly rudimentary by comparison with other tropical forest tribes; the Yąnomamö appear to deliberately limit their possessions to an amount that can be easily transported in case the group is obliged to abandon its site on short notice.

Adaptation to the Sociopolitical Environment

The adaptation of the Yąnomamö to their environment can be only partially expressed in terms of how they make a living in the tropical forest with specific kinds of tools, plants, and techniques, for the forest is only one aspect of the external world to which they must adjust. Their adaptation also takes place in a social and political environment. This likewise affects the way in which the Yąnomamö are distributed over the land, how their villages are moved from one location to another, and the kinds of relationships each village has with its neighbors. In short, the Yąnomamö must relate themselves to each other as well as to nature.

ALLIANCES AND VILLAGE SIZE I spoke of the considerations that must be met when a new garden site is selected. However, the area within which the new site is selected is determined almost exclusively by political factors. A Yąnomamö group would remain indefinitely in the area it settled were it not for the threat of raids from warring neighbors. To be sure, the group would move its garden little by little each year, but the general area would be abandoned only if the people were driven out by stronger groups around them. Again, dissident factions of the village might leave the area if a particularly serious fight developed within the group, but because a garden is necessary for the group to survive as a group, the Yąnomamö abandon them only when faced with disaster. To establish a new garden at a great distance from the old one, a Herculean effort is required just to transport the necessary plantain cuttings and seed, not to mention carrying provisions for eating while the work of clearing the garden and planting the crops progresses. Then, since a new garden produces sporadically for the first year, the people are frequently faced with food shortage. They are, therefore, reluctant to sacrifice the predictability of subsistence at the established garden for insecurity, periods of hunger, and hard work at some distant location.

Instead, they develop political alliances with neighboring villages, thereby adjusting to their social environment. The nature of these alliances is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, but at this point I will make some general statements about the relationships between villages to show why, on the one hand, the social environment calls forth the alliances, and why on the other hand, when alliances fail, a group must abandon its area.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

*621 *623 Village size is an important factor in determining the degree to which a Yąnomamö group must depend on its neighbors for military support in the face of raids. Small villages must make alliances to survive. Village size, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, ranges *621 701 from 40 to 250 inhabitants. Approximately one-third of the village consists of males who are able to participate in the raiding, that is, men who are between 17 and 40 years old. 722 The tactics of warfare are such that a village must be able to field a raiding party of approximately 10 men in order to be able to raid effectively. In addition, when the raiders are away, there must always be a few men at home to protect the women and children. Thus, the military requirements alone seem to demand that a village have at least 15 able-bodied men. As these represent about a third of the group, the minimum village size required by the raiding techniques is 40 to 50 people. I have never seen a village fall below this size in an area where raiding is active, and virtually every village split I investigated took place only when each of the resulting groups contained 40 or more people.

*621 721 .726 The upper limit to village size is also determined in large measure by the intensity of warfare. The village of Patanowä-teri, for example, has over 200 people. It was being raided actively by about a dozen different groups while I conducted my fieldwork, groups that raided it about twenty-five times in a period of fifteen months. The Patanowä-teri at one time had split into three groups of about equal size, but raids from their enemies forced them to reunite for common defense. In general, a village will fission after it [578] reaches a population of about 150 because internal feuds and fights are so frequent that peace can only be maintained with great difficulty. A village of 100 individuals, for example, can fission to produce two militarily viable groups of about 50 people each. Only the threat of raids from powerful neighbors will, as in the case of the Patanowä-teri, inhibit the fissioning, and frequently the fission groups will reunite in a single village to fend off the raids of their enemies.

* [628] But a small group of 40 to 50 people is not as viable as a group twice that size. Consequently, it enters into alliances with its neighbors.

*621 582 166 FISSION AND SETTLEMENT There is a tendency for the group to attempt to maximize its size after it becomes an independent entity. This is done by trying to keep all marriages within the group so that there is very little migration of young men and women to other villages after marriage. A small group also welcomes the addition of families from other villages, families that have gotten into fights in their own group and who prefer to leave rather than attempt to patch up their grievances with their kinsmen. Finally, the group tries to attract young men and women from other villages, encouraging them to settle permanently in the group. Rerebawä, for example, is under considerable pressure to remain permanently in Kąobawä's group.

*621 578 837 As the village grows in size and varies in composition, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep order and peace. Extramarital sexual liaisons are more frequent in larger villages, because the probability is lower that the affairs will be discovered. When the Monou-teri rejoined Kąobawä's group to avoid the raids of their enemies, a bloody club fight developed between two men of that village over an affair one of them had with the other's wife. The culprit waited until the group joined Kąobawä's village before approaching the woman, thinking that with so many people in one village he would not be caught.

By the time a village approaches 100 to 150 people, such fights over women are

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

so frequent that the group elects to fission rather than attempt to keep an uneasy internal peace. Although a larger village has an advantage in terms of its capacity to raid other groups and is better able to defend itself from raids, the internal fights often lead to killings within the group. Then, there is no alternative but for one of the factions to leave. Its members may anticipate a situation like this and begin making a new garden long before the fighting becomes violent enough to lead to deaths, or a fight can develop unexpectedly and result immediately in bloodshed. The guilty faction must then seek refuge in the village of an ally until it can establish its own garden. Usually, however, the larger group fissions while its members are on relatively peaceable terms, and the two resulting villages remain in the same general area so that they can reunite when raids threaten them. This is the situation that prevails between Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri and Monou-teri; all three have a common history as a single village, but the members of each live in separate villages because of the numerous fights that took place within the group while they were still a single village. They continue, however, to rely on each other for protection when raids threaten. The Monou-teri (see Fig. 2-8), in fact, spent about a third of their time in either Lower Bisaasi-teri or in Kąobawï's group while I conducted my fieldwork. They were being raided by the Patanowä-teri and had not completed the new garden they were making. The Patanowä-teri forced them to abandon their producing site and move west.

The Patanowä-teri themselves were forced to establish a new garden because of the incessant raids by a number of villages. In addition to keeping always on the move between their two gardens, they also sought periodic refuge in the village of one of their own allies, a village two days travel to the south of their primary garden.

The raids against the Patanowä-teri by about a dozen villages illustrate a cardinal strategy of Yąnomamö warfare: attack a group when it is beleaguered and weakened by other enemies. When I first arrived, the Patanowä-teri were fighting only three groups. The Monou-teri then entered into the conflict by abducting a number of women from them, an act that ultimately led to raiding and killing. When the Monou-teri entered the conflict, they also persuaded their own allies to participate, bringing four other villages into the war. These, in turn, were joined by some of their allies so that the total number of belligerent villages rapidly grew to about a dozen. Many of them joined the hostilities because they knew that the Patanowä-teri could not defend themselves against a host of enemies. The new belligerents, therefore, stood a good chance of abducting women while being relatively immune to punitive raids. They could also discharge obligations to their allies by supporting their raids against the Patanowä-teri without exposing themselves to great danger.

In Fig. 2-8 the movements of Kąobawï's village over the past seventy-five years is summarized. The village originated at the site of Konata, occupied prior to 1900 by Kąobawï's grandfather. This site was abandoned because several villages (not indicated on the map) began raiding the people with such frequency that they were forced to flee south, cross the Orinoco River, and take refuge with allies at a place called Wareta. Similarly, Wareta was abandoned because of new wars, so the group again crossed the Orinoco River and settled at Namowei. Here, their old enemies again drove them out of the area, so the group migrated to Hąhoyaoba. Kąobawä was born at this location, some forty years ago. This site was abandoned because the soil in that area was very poor; even to this day, there are no Yąnomamö villages located in that general area.

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361 578 The group then crossed the Orinoco for the third time and settled, sometime around 1925 or 1930, at Patanowä. By this time their numbers had increased to such a level that internal feuds were frequent. As the result of many fights, the group split into two villages in about 1940, and eventually entered into hostilities. The part of the village [101] that remained behind took the name Patanowä-teri and has remained to the present at that site. Kąobawä's group fled to Shihoea, but was driven from there to Kreiböwei by the Patanowä-teri. They occupied this site in 1950–1951, when they were massacred during a 361 feast by the members of two Shamatari villages to their south. This led them to take 726 temporary refuge in the village of Mahekodo-teri on the Orinoco River, as they had 721 not had time to make a new garden. Their site at Kobou was established while they 628 lived with the Mahekodo-teri. It was only a vantage point from which they could estab- [841] lish gardens in more suitable areas, areas that were too far removed from Mahekodo-teri to permit the establishment of the gardens in a single move. Thus, Kobou was abandoned after only a few years' occupation there.

361 Kąobawä's group split in the process of abandoning the Kobou garden in 1954, 621 a part of them taking the name Monou-teri. The Monou-teri still live at the site they [782] established in 1954, but they were in the process of abandoning it in 1966 because of [722] renewed raids from the Patanowä-teri. Kąobawä's group moved to the Orinoco again, [101] to the site called Barauwä. By 1959 foreigners had finally reached this area, so Kąobawä [648] and his followers moved down the Orinoco to the mouth of the Mavaca River to establish contact there with a government malaria post. They hoped to obtain steel tools from the family of foreigners at the post. They split into two factions after settling, half of them moving to the opposite bank of the Mavaca River. Thus, Bisaasi-teri has an [101] upstream and a downstream settlement, and the members of these two groups refer to themselves as the Upper and Lower Bisaasi-teri, respectively, Bisaasi being the name of a grass commonly found around gardens.

361 Similarly, the Shamatari villages, indicated as circles in Fig. 2-8, have a settlement 621 pattern characterized by internal village disputes leading to fissioning, gardens being 578 abandoned because of warfare, and a general movement to the south and west away 722 from the Orinoco headwaters. The history of the Shamatari villages is a little more 184 complicated than the history of Kąobawä's group, since village fissioning began much earlier in their moves and produced many more villages. This was probably due to the fact that their original location had more inhabitants. The history of the villages marked as hexagons on the map, Fig. 2-8, is nearly identical in its over-all pattern to the above two groups of villages.

361 Kąobawä's group and the two Shamatari villages of Mąmariböwei-teri and Reya- [134] boböwei-teri (see Fig. 2-8) have, together, made some sixteen major moves during the [648] past seventy-five years (Chagnon 1966, Chap. V). Only one of them was stimulated by [722] poor soil conditions; one additional move was the result of the coming of foreigners. The [578] remaining fourteen major moves resulted from either raids emanating from hostile neighbors, or internal village feuds that led to bloodshed and caused a split in the local group.[9] This should suffice to demonstrate that the political and military relationships between

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 44]

[9]This figure does not include the moves that took place while I lived with the Yąnomamö. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of these.

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villages have a profound effect on the nature of the settlement pattern of Yąnomamö villages, and that this same milieu influences the rate at which larger villages fission into smaller, vulnerable groups.

Finally, I emphasize the importance of cultivation in this pattern of village movements and relocation, particularly in the context of relying on allies. Twice during the history of Kąobawä's group they were obliged to take refuge in the village of an ally. All during my fieldwork the Monou-teri also relied on hospitality of this sort from Kąobawä's group, as they were beleaguered by raids from the Patanowä-teri and had not yet completed their new garden. In short, the fact that the Yąnomamö rely heavily on cultivated food has led to specific obligations between members of allied villages: a good ally is one who will take you in when you are driven from your gardens by enemy raids. The essence of political life, therefore, is to develop stable alliances with neighboring villages so as to create a social network that potentially allows a local group to rely for long periods of time on the gardens of neighboring villages. I will describe the politics of alliance formation in Chapter 4, as it is intimately bound up with feasting, trading, and marriage.

Intellectual Environment

The comparative poverty of Yąnomamö material culture is more than compensated for by the richness and complexity of their theological concepts, myths, and legends.

One of the distinctive features of Yąnomamö cosmology and theology is the opportunity it provides for inventiveness. Individuals can and do modify concepts, embellish them, improve on them and, in general, use their imaginations when trafficking in myths or concepts of the soul and afterlife. In short, there is room for thinkers in Yąnomamö culture.

The result of this is that many variants of the same basic myth can be found over a relatively small area. Indeed, each village will contain people who tell the myth a slightly different way; the basic elements remain the same each time, but personal views are interjected and reflect the idiosyncracies of the narrator. The Yąnomamö appear to enjoy these intellectual exercises, for in myth and cosmology they are able to demonstrate their personal abilities as users of their language, the true language of man.

THE COSMOS The Yąnomamö conceive of the external world as having an origin, boundaries, supernatural beings, and a specific nature.

The cosmos is comprised of four parallel layers, lying horizontally and located one on top of the other (see Fig. 2-4b). They are like inverted platters: gently curved, thin, circular, rigid, and having two surfaces, top and bottom.

The uppermost layer is the "tender" plane: *duku hï mini*. At the present time, it is "empty" or "void" (*bruhi*), but some things had their origins there in the distant past. These moved down to other layers. Today, the uppermost layer is sometimes described as being "an old woman" (*una pata*), a phrase used to describe an abandoned garden or a female who is no longer capable of producing offspring. This layer does not figure prominently in the everyday life of the Yąnomamö; it is merely something that is there and once had a function.

11: Chagnon F-6 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanomama SQ18

These figures represent a *sample* of marriages in the two villages. The sample consists of all married males who are thirty-five years old or younger. The sample was chosen in this fashion because the analysis of the marriage types depends on genealogical information covering several generations. By selecting only the younger men the analysis can be quite easily undertaken. In Patanowã-teri there were 38 men of this category, many of whom had multiple wives. A man with four wives, therefore, represents four marriages. In Lower Bisaasi-teri only 10 married men were below thirty-five years of age and accounted for the seventeen marriages. If all the men were included, the analysis would be inaccurate because I do not have adequately long genealogies for some of the oldest men. Up to 1940, the villages of Patanowã-teri and Lower Bisaasi-teri were not separate entities; they separated from each other at about that time. Patanowã-teri is a large and powerful village, containing 212 people. Lower Bisaasi-teri, with only 51 people, is militarily dependent on several of its allies.

Four types of marriages are shown in Table 3–2. The term prescriptive refers to the kinds of marriages described in Fig. 3–2. An incestuous marriage is defined as a man marrying a woman of his own patrilineage (or his mother or niece reckoned through his mother's side of the family). Marriages resulting from either alliance or abduction have been lumped into a single category because they represent the recruitment of spouses from outside the group. Finally, a few marriages are unexplainable in terms of Yanomamö kinship and marriage equations; these represent marriages between members of distinct lineages that have recently entered into exchanges with each other.

As can be seen from Table 3–2, there is a major difference between the two villages in the proportion of prescriptive marriages on the one hand and alliance marriages on the other. In short, the Patanowã-teri follow their marriage prescriptions far more rigorously than do the Lower Bisaasi-teri. This is so because Patanowã-teri, a much larger village, does not need to enter into marriage alliances with its neighbors; it is politically and militarily capable of an autonomous existence. Most of the alliance-abduction marriages in Patanowã-teri are, in fact, abductions; in Bisaasi-teri most of them are alliance marriages. Therefore, the relative frequency of alliance-type marriages is much lower for Patanowã-teri than for Lower Bisaasi-teri. This difference in marriage behavior stems from the relative abilities of the two groups to maintain military autonomy in a milieu of chronic warfare, a quality that is largely a function of the size of the group. The members of a militarily vulnerable village will breach the marriage prescriptions in order to establish political alliances with neighboring groups by ceding women to them.

TABLE 3–2
MARRIAGE TYPES IN PATANOWÃ-TERI AND LOWER BISAASI-TERI

	Patanowã-teri	Lower Bisaasi-teri
1. Prescriptive	37	7
2. Incestuous	4	1
3. Alliance and/or abduction	8	9
4. Unexplained	3	0
Totals:	52	17

general area, but too hostile to remain together in a single village. Largely due to food theft, their mutual political relationships gradually worsened. The two groups returned to the old site in order to harvest the fruits of the cultivated peach-palm tree, as each tree is owned by the person who plants it. Some of the fruit belonging to a man in one of the groups was stolen by a man in the other group. This led to a club fight between the two villages, after which they parted on hostile terms. The group that included Kąobawä decided to abandon their new garden and establish another one further away, anticipating a raid from the other group. Ultimately, the members of the two villages began raiding each other and entered into a prolonged and bloody war that was still raging when I left the field in 1967.

About 1949, to avoid the Patanowä-teri raids, Kąobawä and his group moved to an even more remote location. From here, they began visiting one of the Shamatari villages, Iwahikoroba-teri, located to the south of them. Unfortunately, the people of Iwahikoroba-teri were allied to the Shamatari group (Ruwahiwä's village) with which Kąobawä's group was at war. At the instigation of Kąobawä's enemies, the Iwahikoroba-teri invited his group to a feast during which many of them were treacherously killed, including Kąobawä's father. This incident took place sometime in the period December–January of 1950–1951. The survivors, many of them badly wounded, fled to a newly cleared garden site they had established a day's walk north of their village. They returned to their village only to obtain food, which they carried back to their new but nonproducing garden. After the wounded had removed the arrow points and were on the road to recovery, the group moved back into their producing garden. By this time word of the treachery had spread to all the villages in the area. The headman of Mahekodo-teri, the only village located on the Orinoco River in 1950, visited Kąobawä's group and invited them to take refuge with his people.[15] Kąobawä and his group readily accepted the invitation, and they moved into Mahekodo-teri, knowing that they could prosecute the war with the Shamatari only if they had allies and could raid from a great distance. Their own village was too close to Shamatari territory, and their capacity to raid was greatly reduced after so many of their men had been killed.

Kąobawä knew that the generous offer from the Mahekodo-teri was not entirely stimulated by altruistic motives. In 1910 his group had been forced to take refuge with an ally because of a war; the ally demanded in return many of the guests' women. Similarly, the Mahekodo-teri coerced Kąobawä's group into ceding a number of women, the price a weakened and dependent village must pay for the support of a stronger ally. It was later learned that the Mahekodo-teri planned to kill the rest of the men and abduct all of the women, but an unexpected war delayed their plot. (See Chagnon 1966.) Two of Kąobawä's sisters were among those claimed by the Mahekodo-teri; one of them still lives there, and the other was taken away from her Mahekodo-teri husband by force by Rerebawä's brother.

Kąobawä and his group lived with their protectors off-and-on for about a year, while they worked assiduously at making their new gardens. Because of internal fighting, they decided to make two new gardens and form two separate villages. The year was

[15] James P. Barker of the New Tribes Mission had just moved into Mahekodo-teri a few months earlier, marking the beginning of the Yąnomamö's first sustained contact with any outsiders. He witnessed the arrival of Kąobawä's group.

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4

Political Alliances, Trading and Feasting

YANOMAMÖ FEASTS take place only when one sovereign group entertains the members of another, allied group. Feasts, in brief, are political events. To be sure, economic and ceremonial implications are also significant, but these are relatively minor when compared to the functions of the feast in the context of forming alliances. The chief purpose of entertaining allies is to reaffirm and cultivate intervillage solidarity in the intimate, sociable context of food presentations, thereby putting the ally under obligation to reciprocate the feast in his own village at a later date, bringing about another feast and even more solidarity.

I will describe in this chapter some of the relationships between trade, economic specialization, historical ties between groups, warfare, and intervillage marriage exchanges, all of which are intimately connected and interact with each other in the process of developing political alliances.

I described in Chapter 2 how the members of independent villages cultivated friendships with each other in the process of establishing themselves in a loose network of allied villages. I then showed in Chapter 3 how Kąobawä's followers were related to him and how he, in turn, was related to the members of several other villages. Now I will take up some of the political consequences of the historical ties and how they shape and mould the nature of specific contemporary relationships between Kąobawä's group and those which have political dealings with it. To illustrate this, I will describe the details of a particular feast in the context of the political ties, both historical and contemporary, existing between Kąobawä's group and the guests at the feast. First, however, I will comment on Yąnomamö alliances in general.

General Features of Alliances

One of the expectations and implications of alliance is that the partners are under obligation to provide shelter and sustenance to each other whenever one of them is driven from his village and garden by a powerful enemy. The beleaguered partner may be

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*628 The beleaguered partner may be
722 obliged to remain in the village of his host for a year or longer, approximately the length
241 of time required to establish a new plantation and productive base from which an inde-
562 pendent existence is possible. Twice in the recent history of Kaobawä's group they were
581 driven from their gardens by more powerful enemies and were forced to take refuge in
582 the village of an ally. In each case the group remained with the ally for a year or so, moving away only after their new garden began producing. In both cases, the hosts demanded and received a number of women from Kaobawä's group without reciprocating in kind, a prerogative they exercised from their temporary position of strength. The longer the group takes advantage of a hosts' protection, the higher is the cost in terms of women, so visitors always make an attempt to establish their gardens as quickly as possible and move into them as soon as they begin producing. Without allies, therefore, the members of a village would either have to remain at their single garden and sustain the attacks of their enemies or disband into several smaller groups and join larger villages on a permanent basis, losing many of their women to their protectors. The jungle simply does not produce enough wild foods to sustain larger groups, and the threat of warfare is such that smaller groups would soon be discovered by their enemies and exterminated.

Because of the ever-present risk of being driven from one's garden, therefore, no Yanomamö village can continue to exist as a sovereign entity without establishing alliances with other groups. Warfare is attended by a bellicose ideology which asserts that strong villages should take advantage of weaker ones and coerce them out of women; to prevent this, all villages should therefore behave as if they were strong. Thus, the military threat creates a situation in which intervillage alliance is desirable, but at the same time spawns a military ideology that inhibits the formation of such alliances: Allies need but cannot trust each other. They are obliged to behave aggressively in order to display their respective strength.

*628 Alliances between villages are the product of a developmental sequence that in-
438 volves casual trading, mutual feasting, and finally the exchange of women. The most
574 intimate allies are those who, in addition to trading and feasting, exchange women. Any
581 developing alliance may stabilize at the trading or feasting stage without proceeding to
582 the woman-exchange phase. These are weak alliances, but serve to limit the degree of
602 war that might possibly obtain between the villages so related: The Yanomamö tend to avoid attacking those villages with which they trade and feast, unless some specific incident, such as the abduction of a woman, provokes them. Allies that are linked by trade and feasting ties, for example, rarely accuse each other of practicing harmful magic. Allies bound to each other by affinal kinship ties, however, are more interdependent because they are under obligation to each other to continue to exchange women. It is, in fact, by the exchange of women that independent villages extend kinship ties to each other.

*628 Members of allied villages are usually reluctant to take the final step in alliance
562 formation and cede women to their partners, for they are always worried that the latter
581 might not reciprocate as promised. This attitude is especially conspicuous in smaller
582 villages, for their larger partners in defense pressure them into demonstrating their solidarity by ceding women; the strong can and do coerce the weak in Yanomamö politics. The weak, therefore, are compelled to exaggerate their strength by bluff and intimidation and by attempting in general to appear to be stronger, militarily, than they really are, thereby hoping to convince their partners that they are equals, capable of an independent

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bawä's group arrived. The men of Kąobawä's group danced both singly and en masse and were invited into the homes of their hosts. At this point their hosts fell upon them with axes and staves, killing about a dozen men before the visitors could break through the palisade and escape. Kąobawä's father was among the victims. Once outside, they were shot from ambush by the Möwaraoba-teri, who managed to kill a few more and wound many others with arrows. A number of women and girls were captured by the hosts, though some were later recaptured by Kąobawä's group in revenge raids. It was probably their host's greed for the women that permitted any survivors at all, as my informants asserted that the Iwahikoroba-teri began chasing the women while the men were still vulnerable. A few of the Iwahikoroba-teri refused to participate in the slaughter and even helped some of Kąobawä's group escape. 628* 574 726

The survivors fled to Kobou, a site they had begun clearing for a new garden. Here they removed the arrow points and nursed their wounds before reluctantly returning to Kreiböwei, their only producing garden. Kobou was still too new to support the group, and hunger forced them to return to Kreiböwei. As this location was well known to their treacherous allies, they wished to abandon it as soon as possible, knowing that their enemies could easily kill the rest of the men and abduct the remaining women. 628* 727 [241]

Within a week or so of the treacherous feast, the Mahekodo-teri, a visiting ally of Kąobawä's group, learned of the massacre and offered aid. The Mahekodo-teri headman himself visited Kąobawä's village and invited the entire group to his village to take refuge. They accepted the offer, and in January of 1951, after conducting one revenge raid on the enemies, moved to Mahekodo-teri. 628* 722 726

The Mahekodo-teri had been allied to Kąobawä's group a generation earlier, but after Kąobawä's group moved away from the Orinoco River, alliance activity had dwindled to just sporadic trading. True to Yąnomamö political behavior, the Mahekodo-teri, being in an obviously stronger bargaining position, offered their protection and aid with gain in mind: they demanded and received a number of their guests' women. Again, the members of Kąobawä's group suspected further treachery from their new protectors and assiduously worked at establishing a new garden. They were forced to stay with the Mahekodo-teri until their new garden could totally support them—about a year. Even during this time, however, they spent weeks on end away from their host's village, carrying their food with them and working on their new plantations. They would return to obtain new food supplies, rest for a few weeks, and leave again. When Mahekodo-teri later split into three factions, Kąobawä and his group learned from one of them the details of a plot in which the Mahekodo-teri were going to kill the men and abduct the women. The only thing that prevented them from doing so was the development of a new war between Mahekodo-teri and another village, one that required the assistance of Kąobawä and his group. [241]

For a few years after the separation from Mahekodo-teri, Kąobawä's group was invited to feast there. Because they suspected that the Mahekodo-teri were plotting against them, however, usually the men alone would attend the feast, thereby reducing the probability of another massacre. The women and children were concealed in the jungle during the time the men were away at the feast. Gradually, the alliance cooled off again and the two groups remained relatively indifferent towards each other, but at peace. 628* 574 722

By 1960, Kąobawä's group had regained some of its military strength and had 628*

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1988) 1988 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

One of Damowä's brothers—who also participated in this raid—was married to one of the victim's daughters.

The Monou-teri had anticipated their raid by clearing a new garden site across the Mavaca River, where they hoped to take refuge after the inevitable revenge raids from Patanowä-teri began. They had hoped to complete their garden before the raids became intense, as the Mavaca River would have provided a natural obstacle to raiders. The Patanowä-teri, however, were infuriated by this killing and raided the Monou-teri immediately. Two of the raiders were Damowä's "brothers."

The raiders caught Damowä outside the new garden searching for honey. This was in the first week of February. He had two of his wives with him and one child. He was looking up a tree when the raiders shot a volley of arrows into his body, at least five of which struck him in the abdomen. He managed to nock one of his own arrows and shoot at the raiders, although he was probably mortally wounded at the time. Then Bishewä, one of the raiders, shot a final arrow at Damowä, piercing his neck below his ear. He fell to the ground and died after being struck by this arrow.

The raiders did not attempt to abduct the women, as they were close to the Monou-teri campsite and they had to cross the Mavaca River to escape. The women ran back to the village to tell the others what happened. Instead of giving chase, as they ought to have done—according to Kaobawä and the others in Bisaasi-teri—the Monou-teri themselves fled into the jungle and hid until darkness, afraid that the raiders might return.

The man who fired the fatal arrow into Damowä's neck was a son of the man the Monou-teri shot in their raid. Two of the men who shot Damowä were his classificatory brothers (members of the same lineage), three were brothers-in-law (including the man who shot the fatal arrow), and one was a man who had been adopted into the Patanowä-teri village as a child, after he and his mother were abducted from a distant Shamatari village.

The Monou-teri burned the corpse of Damowä the next day. They held a mortuary ceremony that week and invited their allies, members of the two Shamatari villages and the two groups of Bisaasi-teri, to participate. Gourds of the dead man's ashes were given to specific men in several of the allied villages, an act calculated to reaffirm solidarity and friendship. Damowä's widows were given to his two eldest surviving brothers.

Kaobawä, a classificatory brother to Damowä, assumed the responsibility of organizing a revenge raid. Damowä's own brothers failed to step forward to assume this responsibility, and for a while there was no leadership whatsoever in Monou-teri. Finally, Orusiwä, the oldest and most competent member of the *Hor* lineage, emerged as the *de facto* village leader, a position he acquired largely by default. He was related to the slain headman as brother-in-law, and their respective descent groups dominated village politics.[2] Hence, leadership in Monou-teri shifted from the *Sha* lineage to the *Hor* lineage.

Kaobawä delayed the revenge raid until April, giving the Monou-teri time to expand their new garden. This date also coincided with the beginning of the rains, thus reducing the possibility of a retaliation until the next dry season and providing the Monou-teri even more time to expand their new garden and abandon the old one.

The Monou-teri were afraid to return to their producing garden, so they divided their time between their newly cleared site, where they worked at cutting timber and

[2] See Table 3-1 and Fig. 3-5 of Chapter 3 for the lineage composition of Monou-teri.

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burning it, and Kąobawä's village, where they took occasional rests to regain their energy. They returned to their old site only to collect plantains, which they carried to the new site. Kąobawä's group then built a new *shabono* and fortified it, anticipating the war they knew would be inevitable. Up to this point, Kąobawä's group, Upper Bisaasi-teri, maintained two small *shabonos* a few yards apart from each other, but they coalesced into a single, larger group and moved into the new *shabono* when it was completed. The visiting Monou-teri also helped them work on the new structure.

Meanwhile, the Patanowä-teri, knowing that they would be raided by the Monou-teri and their allies, also began clearing a new garden. They selected a site abandoned by Kąobawä's group many years ago, knowing that the peach-palm trees were still producing there. By this time the Patanowä-teri were in rather desperate straits. Their old enemies, the several groups on the Orinoco River, began raiding them with even greater frequency, as they had learned that the Monou-teri and Bisaasi-teri were again at war with the Patanowä-teri. A few additional villages began raiding the Patanowä-teri to settle old grudges, realizing that the Patanowä-teri had so many enemies that they could not possibly retaliate against all of them.

The Patanowä-teri then began moving from one location to another, hoping to avoid and confuse their enemies. They spent the dry season in turns at their main producing garden, with the Ashadowä-teri, their only ally, and at their new garden. Each group that raided them passed the word to other villages concerning the location of the Patanowä-teri. If they were not at one place, then they had to be at one of the other two. The raids were frequent and took a heavy toll. At least eight people were killed by raiders, and a number of others were wounded. Some of the dead were women and children, a consequence of the fact that the Patanowä-teri themselves sent a heavy volley of arrows into the village of one of their enemies and killed two women. To revenge this, the enemy began deliberately shooting Patanowä-teri women. Females are normally not the target of raiders' arrows. The Patanowä-teri were raided at least twenty-five times while I conducted my fieldwork. They themselves retaliated as frequently as possible, but could not return tit for tat. They managed to drive their main enemies, the Hasaböwä-teri, away from their garden, forcing them to flee across the Orinoco. They concentrated on raiding this group until they had killed most of the *waiteri* (fierce ones). They were so successful at doing this that the Hasaböwä-teri ultimately withdrew from the war. Several of my informants claimed that they did so because their fierce ones were all dead, and nobody was interested in prosecuting the war any further.

When the Hasaböwä-teri withdrew from the raiding, the Patanowä-teri then concentrated on raiding the Monou-teri. Every time the Monou-teri returned to their main site they found the tracks of numerous men who had visited the village, tracks that always came from the direction of Patanowä-teri. Consequently, the Monou-teri moved into Kąobawä's group for protection, fearing to return to their old site until the jungle was completely inundated by the rains.

Kąobawä's group resented this somewhat and made no bones about reminding the Monou-teri that they were eating large quantities of food from the gardens. When complaining became intense, the Monou-teri moved into the village of the Lower Bisaasi-teri and lived off their produce until the latter also began to complain. Then they traveled to the Mõmariböwei-teri and lived with them for a while, returning to Kąobawä's village when these allies wearied of the visitors. When the hosts, the Lower

722 *628 [662] [576] Bisaasi-teri, for example, wanted to get rid of the Monou-teri, they would hold a feast in their honor. When the going-home food was presented to them, they had no alternative but to leave. It would have been insulting to remain after the food was presented. In between their moves they returned to their own producing site to collect plantains and carry them to their new garden. They subsisted there off the food they carried with them.

The Monou-teri soon resented being treated like pariahs by their allies and began to regain their courage. Much of this treatment was due to the fact that they failed to chase the raiders when Damowä was slain, displaying cowardice instead of ferocity. Many of the men in the Bisaasi-teri groups resented the Monou-teri for this and were not timid about displaying their disgust. The Monou-teri were a burden, as they rarely helped at expanding Bisaasi-teri's gardens and ate a good deal of the time.

721 726 *628 The raid Kąobawä organized to revenge Damowä's death took place late in April. The Shamatari allies—Mõmariböwei-teri and Reyaböwei-teri—were invited to participate, but they failed to send a contingency. As allies never really trust each other, the raid was delayed because some of the Bisaasi-teri suspected that their allies were waiting for the raiders to leave so that they could descend on the poorly protected women and make off with captives. Finally, a few of them did arrive and the *wayu itou* (warrior line-up) got under way. Still, the Bisaasi-teri feared treachery on the part of their Shamatari friends, so the men of Lower Bisaasi-teri decided to stay home and protect the women [574] left behind by the Monou-teri and Upper Bisaasi-teri raiders. A small feast was held to entertain the visiting Shamatari allies.

726 On the afternoon of the feast a grass dummy was set up in the village, and the men who were to participate in the raid conducted a mock attack on the dummy, which was supposed to represent the body of a Patanowä-teri man. They painted themselves black, crept slowly around the village with bows and arrows ready, searching for the tracks of the enemy. They converged at one point, spread out, crept toward the dummy, and, at Kąobawä's signal, let fly with a volley of arrows. The Yąnomamö are good archers. None of the arrows missed its mark, and the dummy, looking like a pincushion, toppled ominously to the ground, a dozen or more bamboo-tipped arrows protruding from it. Then the raiders screamed and ran out of the village, simulating their retreat from the enemy. They drifted back into the village, one at a time or in small groups, and retired to their hammocks to wait for darkness.

The village became unusually quiet shortly after dark. Suddenly, the stillness was [825] pierced by an animal-like noise, half-scream and half-growl, as the first raider marched slowly out to the center of the village, clacking his arrows against his bow, growling his individualized fierce noise, usually a mimic of a carnivore: a wasp, or a buzzard. At [123] this signal—not knowing fully what to expect and a little nervous—I crept from my own [126] hammock and went to the center of the village with my tape recorder. The other raiders joined the first man, coming one at a time after short intervals, each clacking his arrows and growling some hideous noise. Kąobawä stood by and made sure the line was straight and faced the direction of the enemy; he would push or pull the individual warriors until they formed a perfectly straight line, joining them after the last one took his place.

The procession to the line-up took about twenty minutes, as about 50 or so men participated (see Fig. 5-2). When the last one was in line, the murmurs among the

726 If there are novices in the raiding party, the older men will conduct mock raids, showing
701 them how they are to participate. A grass dummy or soft log is frequently employed in
702 this, as was the case in the *wayu itou* held in the village the day before the raiders left. Particularly young men will be positioned in the marching party somewhere in the middle of the single file of raiders so they will not be the first ones to be exposed to danger should the raiders themselves be ambushed. These young men will also be permitted to retreat first. Damowä had a twelve-year-old son when he was killed. This boy, Matarawä, was recruited into the raiding party to give him an opportunity to avenge his father's death. The older men made sure he would be exposed to minimum danger, as this was his first raid.

726 The separated groups of raiders approach the village at dawn and conceal themselves near the commonly used paths to the source of drinking water. They wait for the enemy to come to them. A good many of the victims of raids are shot while fetching water.

Frequently, the enemy is wary and acts defensively at all times when there is an [722] active war going on. Only large groups of people can leave the village, and these are well armed. Raiders will not attack a large group such as this. When the enemy is found to be this cautious, the raiders have no choice but to retreat or to shoot volleys of arrows blindly into the village, hoping to strike someone at a distance. They retreat after they release their arrows, depending on the gossip of other villages to learn if their arrows did find their marks. Rarely, one of the raiders will attempt to enter the village during the night and kill someone while he sleeps. Damowä's younger brother allegedly accomplished this on one raid, but few men are brave enough to try it. Most of the time the raiders manage to ambush a single individual, kill him, and retreat before they are discovered. This is considered to be the most desirable outcome of the raid.

722 The women were nervous, frightened, and irritable while the men were away,
[562] and they were constantly on the lookout for raiders from other villages. This is always
*[628] a time to suspect raiders, since allies occasionally turn on their friends when the women are poorly guarded, abducting as many as possible while their husbands are away.

After several days the women were so frustrated and anxious that fights began to
[578] break out among them. One woman got angry because another one, her sister and co-wife,
[593] left her to tend a small baby. When the mother returned, the angry one picked up a piece of firewood and bashed her on the side of her head with it, knocking her unconscious and causing her ear to bleed profusely.

726 The raiders had been gone almost a week when Kaobawä and his youngest brother
484 staggered into the village, nearly dead from exhaustion. Kaobawä's pains had gotten
[641] so bad that he decided to turn back just before they reached the Patanowä-teri village. He could barely walk by that time and would not have been able to elude pursuers should the enemy have given chase. Shararaiwä, his brother, decided to accompany him back lest he run into a group of Patanowä-teri hunters, or his condition grow even more severe. Shortly after they had dropped out of the raiding party, Shararaiwä stepped on a snake and was bitten. The rains had started, and the snakes were beginning to concentrate on the higher grounds, making walking a hazard. His leg began to swell immedi-
[758] ately, and he could not walk. Hence, Kaobawä had to carry him out on his back, despite the fact that he could barely walk himself. Carrying him for nearly two days, he managed to reach the Orinoco River. Here, he intended to make a bark canoe and float the rest of

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Fig. 5–4. Blowing drugs (ebene) *on the pulverized bones of Damowã, slain Monou-teri headman.*

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located the enemy, but Paruriwã refused to go any further. When he turned back, so did the entire party.

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The Monou-teri and Bisaasi-teri raided against the Patanowã-teri six times while I lived with them, and each time the preparations for the raid closely followed the description given above. The Monou-teri returned to their producing site only when the jungle was inundated; only at that time could they exist without the support of their allies. The remainder of the year they had to take refuge with members of allied villages or expose themselves to the risk of being attacked by superior forces by remaining in their own producing garden.

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The Monou-teri also raided the Patanowã-teri without aid from their allies. One of the raids was conducted near the end of the rainy season, and I was staying in their village at the time the raid was held.

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A special ceremony took place the day before the raid. The gourds containing the ashes of the slain Damowã were put on the ground in front of his brother's house.